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I INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the King as parens patriae was the 
supreme guardian and superintendent of the "goods and 
chattels, lands and tenements" of "idiots and lunatics" 
and infants, "as persons who are unable to take care of 
l themselves". The English crown had claimed this peculiar 
form of guardianship since the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) 
This claim was legally entrenched by the Statute Prerogative 
Regis enacted in 1324 3 which made the King guardian over 
those persons whom a jury of twelve determined to be idiots 
l 
. 4 or unatics. As guardian, the King had to protect the 
person and properties of such incapacitated persons from 
exploitation. He also had the responsibility to maintain 
them and their households out of the proceeds from the 
2 
properties. The profits generated from the management of such 
properties of the idiots accrued to the King, while those from 
the lunatics'were kept in trust and returned to them when they 
came "to right rnind". 5 The actual care of the person and 
the estate of the disabled were, however, delegated to their 
friends and nearest relatives. 6 
This ancient prerogative of the Crown which was 
exercised by the ad hoe reliance on the King's governors was 
subsequently transferred in 1540 to the Court of Wards and 
Liveries 7 which acted as a central ~administrative unit. 8 
However, the Court together with other feudal institutions 
and their incidents faltered under the political climate 
during the English Civil war and in 1660 it was finally 
t~W LIBRARY 
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abolished. The parens patriae jurisdiction over fools 
9 and lunatics was then transferred to the Court of Chancery. 
The subsequent period witnessed the inactivity of the law 
in attempting to cure or to treat the unsound in mind except 
for the establishment of homes under the Poor Laws in which 
some of the mentally abnormal together with the paupers and 
. d 10 vagrants were incarcerate . 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the parens patriae 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery were modified by new 
statutory provisions which gave protection to the estates 
and provided care and treatment of those suffering from 
mental disorder. This series of enactment culminated in 
11 England in the passing of the Lunacy Act 1890. Like the 
rest of the British Commonwealth countries, the dominion of 
New Zealand had been incorporating English statute and common 
12 law into its own statutes. One prime example of such 
a borrowing from the English law is the Lunacy Act 1908 (New 
Zealand) which consolidated and re-enacted earlier Acts. This 
Act was replaced by the Mental Health Act 1911 and this in turn, 
was modified and updated as the existing Mental Health Act 1969. 
The ancient jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in respect 
of those who were incapacitated which New Zealand inherited in 
13 1908 was therefore replaced by statutory provisions under the 
Mental Health Act 1969 as far as the care and protection of 
the person and property of the mentally disordered are concerned. 
This ancient jurisdiction was further diminished by the 
Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 which now provides 
for the management of the property of the aged and the infirm. 
3 . 
It has been acknowledged that the present legislation 
dealing with disabled persons and their property, the Aged 
and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 and the Mental Health 
Act 1969 "represent an unnecessary duplication of statutory 
provisions 11 ~
4 
It would have been better if the two Acts were 
incorporated under one common statutory scheme which covers 
all disabled persons. Under the Mental Health Act 1969, the 
incapacity to manage property is linked to any diagnosis of 
mental disorder. The Public Trustee therefore, automatically 
takes control of all the property of persons committed to a 
psychiatric hospital regardless of their ability to manage 
them. There is no separate hearing to determine their 
capability to deal with property because they are presumed 
incapable of managing their affairs upon their admission to 
a mental hospital. This presumption of incompetence is 
unfounded: 
"[t)he clinical well-being of a patient should be 
distinguished from his 'commercial' competence 
because the two conditions are not synonymous 11 • 15 
The present legislation can also be criticised for failing 
to recognise the fact that there are different degrees of 
incapacity and that some persons may be quite capable of 
performing simple transactions (for example, operating a 
bank account) although they may not be competent in more 
complicated dealings (for example, selling a house) . 16 
Everyone subject to the provisions of the present Acts are 
deemed to be totally incapable of managing their assets and 
need to rely on the person appointed to look after their 
4 • 
property in making any transaction. This has the unnecessary 
effect of depriving disabled persons of their rights to 
manage their own property in those instances when they are 
quite capable of exercising such rights. Another undesir-
able feature of the present legislation is the statutory 
preference in favour of the Public Trustee as the person 
. d 1 h f . · d 17 appointe to contro t e property o incapacitate persons. 
The Public Trustee is a bureaucratic office which assumes 
control over the property of a large number of people and 
as such cannot maintain constant personal communication with 
all its clients. There is a need to appoint an individual 
person who can communicate freely with the disabled person 
and who can therefore exercise his or her managerial functions 
in accordance with the needs and desires of the disabled. 
The existing law in this area is further criticised for being 
unduly concerned with the traditional emphasis on the need 
f f . 18 h h to preserve property or uture generations rat er tan 
allowing disabled persons the maximum rights to control their 
own property. For these and many other reasons which will be 
stated in the later part of the discussion, it is clear that 
the New Zealand law in respect of the property of disabled 
persons is quickly joining the queue signposted "historical 
relics". 
In order to meet current needs and expectations arising 
out of a better understanding of the nature of mental incapacity, 
it is proposed that New Zealand should adopt a guardianship 
scheme for the disabled adults. 19 Such a scheme will emphasise 
5. 
the need to give the disabled maximum control in the 
management of ~heir affairs so as to allow them to exercise 
their rights to property as all "normal" citizens are 
entitled to (the "rights" principles) The need to 
protect the property of the disabled (the "protection" 
principles) is often nothing more than a mask for society's 
paternalism and the unnecessary deprivation of the rights of 
people to manage their own affairs. Although the scheme 
must afford enough protection to the property of disabled 
persons, it must not do so in such a way as to allow the 
"protection" principles triumph over the "rights" principles. 
The answer, it is suggested, is to be found in the appointment 
of substitute decision-makers whose powers are restricted to 
those areas in which the disabled persons are found to be 
incapable of making decisions. Such decision-makers who are 
referred to as "guardians" shall be legally appointed and be 
answerable to the appointing body for the performance of all 
guardianship functions. The appointment of an individual 
person as a guardian for each disabled person will ensure 
that the latter will benefit from a personalised service. 
Under this model of guardianship, the guardians' primary 
duty is to ensure that the disabled persons are maximising 
their own capacities in all matters affecting them. Where 
it is feasible, guardians are expected to consult and to involve 
the disabled in all decision-making processses so that they 
can actually learn how to make these decisions independently. 
This paper proposes a guardianship model which is based 
primarily on the submissions of ~he New Zealand Institute 
M t 1 R _.._ d t. 20 h V . t . en a eLar a ion, t e 1c or1a 21 proposal and the American 
6. 
Bar Association Model Statute. 22 The writer will first 
expound the underlying principles with which the proposed 
guardianship model is supposed to conform with. This will 
be followed by an examination of the class of persons who 
can be put under guardianship. The paper will then discuss 
why individual personal guardians are preferred to 
institutional guardians. Following that, the powers and 
duties of a guardian will be examined in the light of the 
"rights" principle. It is also proposed to explore other 
forms of protection apart from guardianship, such as, citizens 
advocacy. Under the heading "Administration of a Guardian-
ship Scheme" the writer will consider how a determination of 
the need for guardianship is made and which adjudicating body 
shall make such decisions. It is then proposed to consider 
the role of the Public Advocate in the general oversight and 
coordination of all forms of service deliveries within the 
scheme. In view of the fact that guardianship involves a 
serious limitation on the rights of the incapacitated person 
~o ~anage their own affairs, a section of this paper will be 
devoted to the formulation of a procedural framework which 
will ensure that guardianship is not unnecessarily imposed 
on any person. The procedural safeguards suggested will 
include the right of the disabled person to have adequate 
notice of any hearing to determine the need for guardianship, 
the right to be represented in such a hearing and the right 
to have any order imposing guardianship reviewed periodically. 
Finally, it is decided to consider a number of miscellaneous 
features of the guardianship scheme which have so far not been 
7 . 
dealt with in the paper. By way of contrast, the present 
New Zealand legislation will be referred to and its inade-
quacies highlighted throughout the discussion. 
In this paper a distinction is made between the two 
categories of guardianship which are "personal guardianship" 
and "property guardianship". "Personal guardianship" refers 
to the appointment of a guardian to look after the person of 
the disabled and make decisions in all matters which affect 
the personal integrity of the disabled, for example, the 
guardian will have the right to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment to be carried out on the disabled. Such a guardian 
will be called a "guardian of the person" or a "personal 
guardian". On the other hand, "property guardianship" 
refers to the appointment of a guardian to manage the property 
of the disabled and to make decisions in all transactions 
affecting the property. The terms "conservatorship", "estate 
administration" and "estate management" are also used to refer 
to "property guardianship". The guardian appointed in this 
area of guardianship will be referred to as the "property 
guardian", the "conservator", the "estate administrator" 
or the "estate manager". A further distinction is made 
between the two scopes of guardianship which are "plenary 
guardianship" and "limited guardianship". "Plenary guardian-
ship" refers to a form of guardianship in which all decision 
making rights in the area of personal or property guardianship 
or both, are vested in the guardian. The guardian appointed 
with such global powers is called a "plenary guardian". 
"Limited guardianship" refers to a form of guardianship in 
which the guardian is only vested with the rights to perform 
those functions which the disabled person is unable to perform. 
8 • 
The guardian appointed with such restricted powers is 
called a "limited guardian". The disabled person who is 
subject to guardianship shall be referred to as the "ward" 
or "conservatee" (this term is restricted to property 
guardianship). 
It must be noted that although the main thrust of this 
paper is on the property aspect of guardianship, the same 
principles and arguments are equally applicable to the 
guardianship of the person. Very often, the exercise of a 
property right is inextricably linked to the exercise of a 
personal right: 
Making a decision to change residences is not 
necessarily just an exercise of a personal right, 
a right to decide where to live; it might also be 
an exercise of a property right, a right to decide 
how to spend money. Similarly, an incapacity to 
exercise a right to property might result in an 
incapacity to purchase the facilities and services 
needed to exercise fully a personal right. Thus an 
incapacity to manage income might result in an incap-
acity to use the income to purchase a necessary aid 
to personal safety, such as handrails for the home. 
This is not to say that the exercise of personal 
rights always depend on the exercise of property 
rights, just that they are often so very inter-
23 dependent. 
The United States Supreme Court has demolished the artificial 
dichotomy between property and other civil rights: 24 
The right to enjoy property without unlawful 
deprivation, no less than the right to speak or 
the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' 
right, whether the 'property' in question be a 
welfare cheque, a home or a savings account. In 
9 . 
fact, a fundamental interdependence exists 
between the personal right to liberty and the 
personal right to property. Neither could nave 
meaninq without the other. 
It is therefore, essential to have a single scheme which 
provides for both property and personal guardianship. The 
lack of such a unified scheme for both aspects of guardian-
ship highlights one of the major deficiences of the present 
New Zealand law which only deals with property administration. 
Unfortunately, the proposed new legislation25 makes no attempt 
to integrate the property administration proposals with the 
personal guardianship proposals. 26 
10. 
II PRINCIPLES ON WHICH GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION SHOULD 
BE BASED 
Some paradox in our nature leads us, once we 
have made our fellow men [or women] the objects 
of our enlightened interest, to go on to make 
them the objects of our pity, then of our wis-
dom, ultimately of our coercion. 27 
In framing any guardianship laws, it is important, first to 
identify and clarify the principles which these laws must 
reflect. For the guardianship scheme proposed by the writer, 
these principles are as follows: the need to protect the 
disabled, normalisation and integration, presumption of 
competence, least restrictive alternative and procedural 
due process. The first principle is referred to generally 
as the "protection" principle and the rest are collectively 
labelled as the "rights" principles. 28 The "protection" 
principle embodies the protective instincts of society to 
provide care for its members who, because of mental disability, 
are unable to look after themselves of their property. In 
the context of a guardianship scheme, the extreme form of 
such protection manifests itself in the concept of plenary 
guardianship. The "rights" principles, on the other hand, 
seek to maximize the development of disabled persons in the 
independent exercise of their rights. The dilemma, then, 
is between "protecting" and "liberating" the disabled person. 29 
To resolve the dilemma, it is submitted that a balance be 
struck in favour of the "rights" principle. 30 The concept 
of limited guardianship achieves such a balance by giving 
protectio n in those areas of incapacity while, at the same 
11. 
time, allowing the disabled the maximum rights consistent 
with their abilities. 
A. The Need to Protect the Disabled 
The state in its role as parens patriae not only has 
an interest but also a duty to protect those of its citizens 
who are incapacitated against neglect, exploitation or abuse 
by their fellow citizens. Where the general laws applicable 
to all citizens are inadequate, society must seek to provide 
special protective services to insure the disabled against 
their vulnerability and dependency. Traditionally, the response 
of the state to the mentally abnormal has been the provision 
of institutional protection for their person and property by 
way of civil commitment. The recent movement away from 
institutionalisation has led to development of the concept 
of guardianship as an alternative form of providing protective 
services. This protective function of guardianship is 
evidenced by Article 5 of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of the Mentally Retarded which provides as follows: 
"The mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified 
guardian when this is required to protect his personal well-
being and interests 11 • 31 
At present, there is no statute in New Zealand providing 
for the personal guardianship of adults and therefore, any 
protectio n offered to the disabled is either through civil 
commitment, 32 the use of laws designed to protect the ordinary 
person or by informal means through concerned relatives and 
friends. However, there are some occasions when such means 
are inadequate or inappropriate, for example, a disabled 
person who is in need of a major operation may be unable to 
12. 
understand the implications of such a procedure and therefore 
cannot give a valid consent. In such a case, the only lawful 
solution would be to appoint a legal guardian who will have 
33 the power and the responsibility to give such consent. 
The Mental Health Act 1969 and the Aged and Infirm 
Persons Protection Act 1912 can be said to provide a form 
f d . h. b . d l. 34 h o property guar ians ip ut as pointe out ear ier, t e 
emphasis of these Acts on protecting and preserving property 
has resulted in the loss of the rights of the disabled to 
control their property. 
In summary the law in New Zealand in respect of the 
protection of the disabled can be described in the following 
way: there is a lack of protection for the person of the 
disabled and an overprotection for the property of those who 
come under the Mental Health Act 1969 and the Aged and 
Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912. 
B. Normalisation and Integration 
The principle of normalisation has received increasing 
attention in the area of human services throughout North 
America as a philosophical basis of their service delivery. 
The origin of the concept of normalisation stems from a belief 
that societies do reject some members on the basis of their 
perceived deviance and that this rejection often leads to the 
relegation of disabled persons to low-quality and harmful 
forms of services - for example, segregation in custodial 
. 35 settings. Normalisation counteracts this negative perception 
by challenging human services to enhance both the skills and 
13. 
the societal image of their clients. It is a misconception 
to visualise normalisation as a process of making retarded 
people normal; in truth, it has a far more modest role-
to enable them to live under conditions as normal as their 
handicaps will allow. 36 The United Nations has declared 
and affirmed "the necessity of assisting mentally retarded 
9ersons to develop their abilities in various fields of 
activities and of promoting their integration as far as 
possible in normal life 11 • 37 
The Alberta Act has encapsulated the concept of 
normalisation in the guardianship area by providing that 
a guardian shall act "in such a way as to encourage the 
dependent adult to become capable of caring for himself 
and of making reasonable judgments in respect of matters 
38 relating to his person". A faithful adherence to the 
concept of normalisation entails the right of the disabled 
to make mistakes as all normal people do. It may be conunon 
knowledge that "one learns from one's mistakes"; however, 
that experience can only be enriched if one bears the 
responsibilities of such actions. 
So under the principle of normalisation, guardianship 
would not be used merely to protect the mentally 
retarded from their own mistakes just as no measure 
restricting rights would be used merely to protect 
the "normal" from their own mistakes. 39 
The law must therefore make provisions for attaching legal 
responsibilities for the exercise of legal rights. For example, 
in the area of contracts, a disabled person must bear the 
consequences of onerous contracts. The amount of responsibility 
14. 
to be imposed must take into account the abilities and 
limitations of each individual person. To legislate for 
a blanket immunity from all contractual obligations would 
. d d 1. . 40 impe e progress towar s norma isation. This may result 
in persons refusing to enter into any contract with intell-
ectually handicapped persons
41 
and therefore making it difficult 
for such person to engage in the normal day-to-day transactions 
essential for full community living. 
In New Zealand persons whose property are administered 
under the Mental Health Act 1969 42 can nullify any contract 
which they have entered into except where the contract is for 
. 43 necessaries. For those persons who come under the Aged and 
44 Infirm Persons Act 1912 any contact entered by them except 
for necessari2s is automatically nullified. 45 This almost 
complete immunity from ccntractual obligations given to 
protected patieLts and protected persons is clearly contrary 
to the principle of normalisation. The only reflection of the 
normalisation principle in the New Zealand legislation is found 
in the consultation provision of the Mental Health ACt 1969 
where it is provided that the person appointed to look after 
the estate of the disabled 46 shall consult the latter "so far 
as it is practicable and expedient" and "may" follow or act 
on the advice given by the protected patient.
47 In comparison 
wi~h the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 where no 
such provision is made, the consultation orovision seems 
commendable. However, it must be noted that it is entirely 
discretionary for the manager to consult the protected patient. 
One wonders how often, in actual practice, ~he discretion to 
15. 
consult is exercised. It is submitted that in any 
guardianship scheme that holds true to the principle 
of normalisation, a duty must be imposed on guardians to 
consult their wards in all major decisions. 
In conclusion it must be noted although the objectives 
of normalisation and integration cannot be easily translated 
into narrow and precise rules of law, the very process of 
legislating such general principles, will serve a valuable 
d . f . 48 e ucative unction. The writer suggests that any proposed 
guardianship scheme in New Zealand must delcare in its long 
title, the value of normalisation as one of its objectives. 
c. Presumption of Competence 
In order to safeguard the personal dignity and 
individuality of disabled persons, there must remain a 
presumption of competence to enjoy all rights until it can 
be clearly shown by due process procedures that they are 
incapable of effectively exercising them. 
The movement away from the rights principles in favour 
of the protection principle may result in less concern for 
the development of the individual and for the rights of the 
mentally disabled. 
A question arises as to what extent we should presume 
competency and allow disabled persons the right to make 
49 choices and decisions which may be "bad" for them? We 
cannot simply abandon them to their rights nor can we over-
emphasise on protection. To achieve the maximisation of 
rights may be difficult in practice; guardians, parents and 
16. 
advocates have to balance their protective instincts towards 
the disabled but at the same time allowing them the greatest 
. ab"l" . 50 freedom consistent with their i ities. 
A presumption of competency complements the idea of 
normalisation. It reduces the vision of the mentally 
disabled as helpless and incapable of exercising rights. 
This perception is untenable because current medical knowledge 
has revealed that mental health is not a black or white 
situation in which a person has either extremely limited 
capabilities or, he or she has full capacity. 51 On the 
. b . d . 52 contrary, capacity must e viewe as a continuum. Every 
mentally retarded person has "unique abilities and competencies 
with varying disability 11 • 53 
Before a proper assessment of the capacities of disabled 
persons is made, such persons must always be presumed competent. 
To put it in another way - the protection principle must give 
way to the rights principles. It is unfortunate to note that 
professionals including lawyers should feel that "it was merely 
a play on words to say that a mentally disabled person should 
b d • 11 54 not e presume incompetent . This attitude is clearly 
reflected by the present New Zealand Legislation on property 
guardianship. Under the Mental Health Act 1969, all persons 
committed into psychiatric hospitals are automatically presumed 
55 to be incompetent in managing their property. Like most 
guardianship statutes, the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection 
Act 1912 focuses on the general disabling condition of the 
subject of the proceedings, for example old age, physical or 
17. 
1 . f. . . 56 menta in 1rm1t1es. Upon the proof of such disability, 
the finding that the subject cannot care for his or her 
property and therefore needs guardianshii:, follcws almost automaticallv. 57 , 
There is, therefore, in New Zealand a nresumption of incCJr!1?etence in both 
the 1@·7 and Dractice. 
D. The Least Restrictive Alternative Form of Protection 
In order to resolve the tension between the rights 
principles and the protection principle in favour of the 
former, the principle of the least restrictive alternative 
has been applied in the area of mental disability. 
Under this principle, a preference must be given 
to that means of accomplishing an end that least 
restricts individual rights. In the context of 
guardianship law, following this principle would 
mean two things. First, that guardianship would not 
be ordered for an individual unless no measure which 
would restrict that person's rights less than 
guardianship would is sufficient to protect that 
person. Second, that, if guardianship is deemed 
to be the least restrictive alternative available, 
then that type or form of guardianship would be 
ordered that accomplishes the purpose of protection 
with the least possible restriction of individual 
rights. In other words, no guardianship is to be 
preferred over limited guardianship and limited 
guardianship is to be preferred over plenary 
guardianship whenever possible. 58 
The form of protection offered or rather, imposed by the 
New Zealand legislation cannot be said to be consonant with 
the least restrictive alternative principle. Under the 
18. 
Mental Health Act 1969 all persons conunitted to psychiatric 
hospitals are automatically given guardianship protection over 
their property without any consideration of other forms of 
protection which may be less restrictive of the rights of the 
protected patient. Similarly, protected persons under the 
Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 only receive one 
form of protection - guardianship. There are clearly, other 
less restrictive forms of protection which may be applicable 
to protected patients and persons, for example, the use of a 
power of attorney. This legal device allows a person to 
delegate his or her rights for only one specific transaction 
59 or a number of such transactions to another pe~son. 
Even if guardianship is the most appropriate form of 
protection for some persons who fall within the New Zealand 
Acts, it may still be a highly restrictive form of protection 
because these Acts generally provide guardianship in the 
plenary form. Under the Mental Health Act 1969, the Public 
Trustee as manager of a protected patient's estate automatically 
assumes global powers although a manager may only be needed to 
d . l . 60 con uct one singe transaction. The Aged and Infirm Persons 
Protection Act 1912 confers identical powers to the Public 
61 Trustee except that the Court may exempt part of the estate 
of the protected person from the guardianship of the Public 
62 Trustee. There is no provision in either Act for limited 
guardianship in those cases where the person is only incapable 
of making a few decisions but is otherwise quite competent. 
In this respect, the law in New Zealand does not reflect 
the principle of least restrictive alternative form of 
19. 
protection. Any future guardianship legislation should 
provide for limited guardianship which tailor-suit~ a 
guardian's powers to the needs of the ward. This would 
avoid over-protection and any unnecessary restriction of 
rights. 
E. Due Process of Law 
The due process of law proclaims that any exercise of the 
powers of the state in restricting the rights of the individual 
to life, liberty and property must be achieved by means of a 
fair procedure. 63 The primary concern of due process is to 
ensure that no-one is wrongly deprived of his or her rights. 
This concern is perhaps, best illustrated by the common law 
"maxim" that it is better to have nine guilty persons go free 
than to have one innocent person convicted. The elements of 
a fair procedure include the existence of a competent 
tribunal of adjudication, the service of adequate notice 
to the person whose rights are affected, the right to be 
present at the hearing the ri~ht to be legallv reDresented 
64 and the right to defend. 
Since a determination to put a person under guardianship 
involves a restriction of rights, the guardianship hearing 
procedures must conform with the due process principle. In 
terms of the elements of due process as enumerated above, 
New Zealand law seems lacking in due orocess . Under the 
Mental Health Act 1969, property guardianship is automatically 
imposed on every patient who is committed to a psychiatric 
hospital. It seems illogical that the need for commitment 
should amount to a finding of incompetence to manage property. 
20. 
The due process of law would require a separate hearing 
for determining an incapacity to manage property before a 
person can be put under property guardianship. Although 
the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 requires 
initially, a finding of a particular class of incapacity, for 
example, old age or physical and mental infirmity, as well as 
an inability to manage property; in practice, a finding of 
the first requirement is almost automatically followed by 
the finding of the second requirement. 65 Apart from the 
lack of due process in the determination of a person's incap-
acity to manage property, there are also a number of other 
significant procedural safeguards missing in the New Zealand 
66 Law. 
21. 
III WHO CAN BE PUT UNDER GUARDIANSHIP 
Since guardianship can be a highly restrictive form of 
protection,
67 it is important that the criteria for imposing 
guardianship be specifically defined so that people are n
ot 
unnecessarily deprived of their rights to the management 
of 
their own property. Before explaining such criteria wh
ich 
will best ensure that the rights principles are adequatel
y 
reflected in preference to the protection principle, it 
is proposed first, to examine the present standards under
 
the New Zealand Acts. 
A. Mental Health Act 1969 
In the eighteenth century, madmen were locked 
up in madhouses: in the nineteenth century, 
lunatics were sent to asylums; and in the 
twentieth century, the mentally ill receive 
t t t . h . 1
 68 rea men in ospita s. 
Under the Mental Health Act 1969 the persons who can be 
hospitalised are divided into three classes namely, infor
mal 
patients, conunitted patients and special patients.
69 Informal 
patients are those who voluntarily arrange to be admitted
 i n 
a psychiatric hospital and who may have themselves discha
rged 
at their own will.
7° Conunitted patients are those who are 
1 · 1 d . d d . d 
71 · 1 h 
compu sori y etaine un er a reception or er unti t e
y are 
discharged at the discretion of the suoerintendent of the
 
h . l 72 ospita . Special patients are -
those charged with a criminal offence but due 
to a mental incapacity are unable to be tried; 
or those who are convicted, and either at sentencing 
or later, require hospitalisation rather than penal 
detention due to a mental disorder.73 
22. 
The care and protection of the person of a patient is 
provided by the superintendent and the staff within the 
h . l 74 ospita . 
The property of a patient is automatically protected and 
administered under Part VII of the Mental Health Act provided 
the patient comes within the definition of a "protected 
patient". Every committed patient who is subject to a 
reception order is a protected patient and so are a few other 
. 75 patients. 
B. Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 
The Act provides for the property guardianship of the 
aged and the infirm by way of a protection order granted by 
the High Court. A person who is subject to such an order 
is called a protected person. Unlike the Mental Health Act 
1969 where a committed patient automatically becomes a pro-
tected patient, the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 
1912 requires someone to make an application to the Court 
. 
to have a person made a protected person. The Court will only 
exercise its discretion to make a protection order upon the 
fulfilment of a two-step requirement. 76 First, the person 
must fall within a diagnostic category of disability such 
as advanced age, disease, physical or mental illness or 
. f. . 1 b 1. 77 in irmity or menta su norma ity. Second, that by reason 
of such a category of disability, the person is a) unable, 
wholly or partially to manage his or her own affairs; or 
b) is subject to, or liable to be subjected to undue influence; 
or c) otherwise is in a position which the Court thinks should 
23. 
78 be protected. Similarly, those persons who consume 
alcohol or drugs to such an excessive extent that they are 
unable, wholly or partially to manage their own affairs may 
1 b b . t . d 79 h . t a so e su Jee to a protection or er. Te requiremen 
of the existence of a particular class of disabling condition 
under the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 is 
emphasised in the case of Re M80 where it was held : 
... [P]rodigality, improvidence, business 
incompetence, facility of will or excessive 
generosity, unless due to age, disease, illness, 
physical or mental infirmity (s 4) or taking or 
using in excess alcoholic liquors, or any intox-
icating, stimulating, narcotic, or sedative drugs 
(s 5), can never give jurisdiction to make a 
protection order under this Act. The Welfare 
State still permits a man to waste or give away 
his substance unless one or other of those 
conditions is fulfilled. 
C. Assessment of the New Zealand Acts 
The two New Zealand Acts can be criticised on a number 
of grounds for emphasising the protection principle at the 
expense of the rights principles. First, by automatically 
depriving mentally disordered persons of their rights to 
administer their own property, the Mental Health Act 1969 
is working on the false premise that all those who are 
committed to mental institutions are incapable of managing 
80 property. The issue of the capacity of disabled persons 
to manage their affairs and need for guardianship must be 
separated from the issue of their need for hospitalisation. 
Moreover, in view of the recent trends in psychiatric treatment 
24. 
which indicate that a person may frequently be discharged 
f h . d f . . h 
81 d' h' a ter as ort-perio o intensive t erapy, guar ians ip 
may be a highly restrictive form of protection. There may 
only be a few transactions needed during the short stay in 
hospital and these could have been carried out by a less 
restrictive alternative form of protection, for example, 
getting the Court to ratify these transactions. 
At first sight, the two-tiered requirements of the 
Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 may appear to 
be stringent standards of imposing guardianship. However, 
the finding of the first step requirement of a diagnostic 
category of incapacity such as age, infirmity, alcoholism or 
drug addition has, in practice meant that the second step 
requirement of an inability to manage peroperty is taken 
. 11 82 automatica y. Moreover, the catch-all provision of 
section 4(c) of the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 
1912 which states that any person who -
is by reason of age, disease, physical or 
mental illness or infirmity or mental sub-
normality, in a position which in the 
opinion of the Court renders it necessary in 
the interest of such person or of those 
dependent upon him that his property should 
be protected 
has resulted in 
creating the most open-ended standard 
imaginable. Such a provision certainly 
ensures that no-one needing protection is 
excluded from the law's reach, but, at the 
same time, it gives unlimited scope for 
violation of such rights principles as maxim-
isation of self-determ~nation, normalisation, 
25. 
presumption of competence, and minimis-
. 82A 
ation of stigma. 
D. Proposed Alternatives 
The State of Victoria proposes a generic approach based 
on the criterion of "need" alone; replacing the traditional 
approach of focusing on the causative origins of disability 
such as age and physical or mental infirmity which, arguably, 
. bl f . h d f d · h · 
8 3 
are responsi e or generating t ose nee s or guar ians ip. 
By shifting the focus away from the disabling condition, 
such a provision which concentrates solely on need will help 
to counteract the presumption of incompetence, which tends 
84 
to surface whenever a disabling condition is proved. In 
addition, it will reduce stigma which arises out of the use 
of labels such as senility, mental illness or alcoholism: 
(T]he shift in focus lessens the stigma 
attached to being put under guardianship, 
because it discourages, to some extent, the 
use of labels, labels being the primary means 
by which negative experiences with one 
individual become generalised into negative 
attitudes about all other individuals with 
the same label.
85 
Under the Victoria proposal the category of persons in need 
of guardianship would be those who are "incapable of making 
86 
reasonable judgments for themselves". The comments made 
against Alberta's Dependent Adults Act 1976 (Section 6) which 
states the inability to make reasonable judgments, as one 
of its criteria, applies equally to the Victoria proposal: 
26. 
Every one of the four criteria making up the 
standard embodied in this provision (unable to 
make reasonable judgments, unable to care for 
self, in need of a guardian, best interests) 
permits the uncontrollable exercise of value 
judgments, pure and simple. To concentrate 
on the strictest of the requirements, what is 
a "reasonable" judgment? It could be said that 
a judgment is reasonable only if it is the 
one most likely to bring about a result which is 
in the best interests of the person involved. 
One problem with this definition is that it sets 
a standard which even most "normal" persons could 
not meet. It is not uncommon for people to pick 
highly risky ways to accomplish results in their 
best interests. By requiring the mentally retarded 
to be better decisionmakers than nonretarded persons, 
this definition violates the principle of normal-
. t. 86A isa ion. 
The proposed law in New Zealand is rather vague in stating 
the criterion for imposing guardianship. It basically 
follows the Victoria proposal in making the cause of a person's 
incapacity immaterial: 
The new legislation is proposed to apply to all 
incapacited persons who can no longer manage their 
own affairs .... If his incapacity from whatever 
cause precludes him from managing his affairs, 
wholly or partially, then the new legislation 
should apply. 8
7 
As can be seen above, the proposed criterion makes no attempt 
to spell out how to judge when incapacitated persons "can 
no longer manage their affairs". Applied strictly, the only 
occasions when people can no longer manage their own affairs 
2 7. 
are when they are dead, missing or in a coma. Otherwise, 
everyone can generally manage their property; whether they 
manage them properly or not is another matter. Clearly, 
this approach is not intended by the authors of the proposals. 
The other possible intention of the proposals would be to 
simply delete the words "by reason of age, disease, physical 
or mental illness or infirmity or mental subnormality" from 
Section 4 of the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 
and then reenacting Section 4 without these words. This 
would expand the scope of Section 4 and "leave wide open the 
possibility of removing the rights of persons who are fully 
capable of making decisions but happen to make decisions 
88 
others do not approve of". 
Instead of having a value-laden standard based on an 
inability to make reasonable decisions or a vague and open-
ended standard based on the inability to manage property, 
the writer proposes a criterion which concentrates on t he 
quality of the thought-process in decision making. This 
involves the examination of the person's ability to under-
stand and evaluate information pertaining to the specific 
decision to be made. Hence, the focus is on the ability 
to perform the process of making decisions rather than on the 
wisdom or reasonableness of the final decision. 
Focusing on this process avoids the logical 
fallacy of assuming that because a decision 
seems inexplicable, disturbing, or irrational 
in a given instance or series of instances, it 
must be true that the.decision-mak er is incapable 
f t . 1 d . . k' 89 o ra 1ona ec1s1on-ma 1ng. 
28. 
Therefore, guardianship would not be imposed on those 
who are capable of receiving and weighing data but still 
make what appears to be unreasonable or bad decisions. Such 
persons who should not be protected would include the 
unsuccessful investor, spendthrifts or those with excessive 
generosity. A lot of "normal" people fall within these 
categories and yet do not need any State intervention in 
their lives because they can weigh up the pros and cons 
in their decision making process. A businessman who takes 
unnecessary risks and is losing a lot of money may appear 
to be in need of guardianship protection. However, that 
person may fully appreciate the risks involved and decide 
to take a "gamble" because of the chances of earning huge 
profit returns. On the other hand, there are those who 
may make exactly the same decisions as the unsuccessful 
investor or the spendthrift but will be in need of guardian-
ship because of an absence of the process of understanding 
and evaluation in reaching those decisions. 
Any future legislation in New Zealand should therefore, 
adopt a standard which avoids looking at the existence of 
a disabling condition and which focuses solely on the quality 
of the thought process in decision making. This will ensure 
that guardianship protection is applied to those who really 
"need" protection and not simply applied as a blanket form 
of legal paternalism. 
29. 
IV THE IDEAL GUARDIAN 
A. A ~erson preferred to an office 
Apart from being a s~bstitute decision maker, the 
guardian also has a role in assisting and training 
the ward so that he or she can assume more decision 
making responsibilities in the process of normalisation 
and integration. This requires the guardian to be a 
person who can and is willing to be in regular contact 
with the disabled person in order to make decisions which 
are sensitive to the true extent of his strengths and weak-
nesses. An office like the Public Trustee cannot achieve 
that personal interaction between a guardian and a ward 
which is necessary in a limited guardianship scheme. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the Public Trustee or its 
staff has the time to keep in regular communication with 
disabled persons, let alone monitor their daily progress 
in decision making and encourage or train them. More 
likely than not, the Public Trustee like all bureaucratic 
structures will develop standardised approaches to estate 
administration to streamline its workload - all to the 
detriment of the disabled person. Apart from the lack of 
a personal one-to-one relationship between the guardian 
and the ward, the South Australian Public Trust office 
has been criticised for delays in payments, administrative 
h 11 d . fl . b. 1 . 
9 O c arges on sma estates an in exi 1 ity. On the 
91 
contrary, the Victorian Public Trustee sees its merits 
as a guardian as follows It is government guaranteed 
against loss of capital, it is subject to audit by the 
Auditor-General, it is impartial and therefore resolves 
actual and potential family conflicts, it offers a complete 
service through its specialised legal, accounting, tax 
30. 
and investment officers, it does not operate for the 
benefit of private shareholders or partners as other 
professional trustee companies do, its modest profits 
go to treasury for administration of the Office. 
Another reason why the Public Trustee should be preferred 
is because as an already existing office, it avoids 
the cost of having to set up a new structure. 
Rather than express a preference for an individual 
or the Public Trustee,
92 the ideal solution would be to 
express no such preference and allow flexibility for the 
guardianship tribunal who would be likely to appoint the 
Public Trustee in many cases. 
B· Which persons? 
In the event that a person is preferred, the next 
problem is to appoint which particular person. The 
American Bar Association proposes the following de-
d . d f . ' t 
93 
seen ing or er o priori y : 
a) the individual nominated by the disabled person; 
b) the current conservator; 
c) a spouse of the person; 
d) an adult child of the person; 
e) a parent of the person; 
f) the individual nominated by the will of a 
deceased parent; 
g) any individual with whom the person has living 
for more than six months; 
h) a sibling of the person; 
i) a volunteer public guardian. 
31. 
The top priority given for the nominated individual (a) 
is a recognition of the concept that the express wishes 
of disabled persons should always be taken into account 
in order to preserve their autonomy. Moreover, it is 
best that a guardian be someone that the person has the 
fullest confidence in so that the result can be a fruit-
ful relationship. 
The preference for the current legal guardianship (b), 
or failing that, the de facto guardian ensures that 
a guardian who has done a good job is allowed to continue. 
The choice of relations reflects the desirability of 
preserving existing family relationships. While it 
may appear that members of the same family may have the 
special care and concern that arises out of a blood 
relationship, it could well be a mask for potential 
conflicts of interests. Close relatives and expectant 
heirs who apply for guardianship to prevent dissipation 
of assets may in fact achieve the result of benefitting 
94 
the family and heirs more than the disabled person. 
This conclusion is supported by empirical studies which 
show that it is often his or her family from which the 
. d . 95 patient most nee s protection. By requiring relatives 
who want to serve as estate administrators to renounce all 
future interest in the ward's estate may be unduly harsh. 
To avoid this problem, it may be wise to appoint a 
volunteer public guardian (i) who has nothing to gain 
from the estate and expects no monetary benefits. This 
32. 
is also useful for those whose meagre estate cannot 
afford professional guardianship. The New Zealand 
Institute of Mental Retardation (Inc.) 96 has advocated 
for the establishment of a volunteer guardianship scheme. 
Volunteers will be recruited from among ordinary citizens 
and trained by some public agency independent of service 
providers. Where it may be difficult for one single 
individual to administer a big estate, the Public Trustee 
or a professional trust agency should be appointed as joint 
property administrators. However, it would be best if one 
person could serve as both personal and property guardian. 
These two areas of guardianship are so intimately connected 
that the exercise of one ultimately involves a consideration 
of the other. For example, a decision to change residence 
(personal guardianship) is pointless if the finance 
to effect the move is not available. 
C. Institutional Guardians as a Last Resort 
It has been pointed out by numerous critics that an 
institution or provider of mental disability services, 
for example, the Department of Health, should not 
d . f 1· 97 serve as a guar ian or a c ient. The obvious reason 
for this view was that there would be an inherent conflict 
of interest between the provider's interest in having 
clients available to serve and the personal needs of the 
disabled. Moreover, there would be no-one to ensure that 
the service provider was providing services. 
public acceptance of public guardianship 
To ensure 
some American states have separated guardianship functions 
33. 
from other service delivery roles by creating independent 
guardianship agencies severed from service delivery 
bodies or their sister organisations.
98 
To enhance public confidence in the guardianship scheme, 
it has also been pointed out that an advocacy {watch 
dog) agency which would investigate complaints against 
guardians and generally protect the interest of wards 
in guardianship proceedings should not also act as 
d . . 
99 
a guar ian in any case. Despite the concern for 
preventing this apparent conflict of interest between 
the functions of an ombudsman and a guardian, some states 
have decided to amalgamate the two functions into one 
b d 
100 
0 y. 
Public guardianship, except in the form of the Public 
Trustee should remain a matter of last resort when all 
other forms of guardianship, individual, corporate or 
. ·1 bl 101 agency is unavai a e. 
Rather than making a priority list for the possible 
estate administrators as the American Bar Association 
h d 
102 · b d . bl t h t as one it may e more a visa e o ave a sys em 
which recruits a guardian by identifying the requisite 
qualities that a good administrator should possess, 
namely someone who will -
"a) act in the best interests of the represented 
person; 
b) not be in a position where his interests 
conflict or potentially conflict with those 
of the represented person; 
and 
c) be a suitable person to act as the administrator 
34. 
of the estate of the represented person. 11103 
The Tribunal is further required to take into account -
"a) the compatability of the proposed admin-
istrator with the represented person; 
b) the compatability of the proposed admin-
istrator with any guardian which the 
represented person might have; 
and 
,,104 
c) the wishes of the represented person. 
This method will ensure that only the estate manager who 
can best perform the task is chosen instead of someone 
who,by reason of status as a relative,is appointed 
regardless of management abilities. 
V 
35. 
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF A GUARDIAN; 
LIMITED VS. PLENARY GUARDIANSHIP 
In this Section it is proposed first to examine 
the concepts of plenary guardianship in comparison with 
limited guardianship. The desirability of limited 
guardianship powers for the guardian will be highlighted 
in the course of the discussion; and in addition, the 
principles on which a guardian's powers and duties should 
be based will be examined. 
A. Plenary Guardianship 
Plenary Guardianship, a form of guardianship in which 
all decision-making rights, in the area of property manage-
ment or personal management or both, are vested in the 
guardian, in an institutionalised form represents a less 
restrictive alternative form of protection. It has been 
favoured, in part because of its familiarity and predomin-
antly because it holds a fatal attraction of offering the 
flexibility of unlimited power which provides the guardian 
with sufficient authority to deal with every problem that 
. 105 arises. The form of property guardianship offered 
by the New Zealand legislation is essentially plenary in 
nature. By virtue of Sections 93(1), 95(1) and 106(2) of 
the Mental Health Act 1969, and Section 10 of the Aged and 
Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912, the Public Trustee acting 
as manager is given all the powers laid down in the Third 
36. 
Schedule of the Mental Health Act 1969. The plenary 
nature of these powers are such that the protected patient 
or person is left with no rights to their property. The 
Public Trustee has the rights to take possession of all the 
106 property of the ward, apply and expend in its discretion 
107 
any money of the ward for a number of purposes, sell, 
lease or otherwise dispose of the property of the ward in its 
discretion.
108 These are just some of the powers that a 
Public Trustee or a manager has in relation to a ward. The 
plenary form of guardianship protection given by the New 
Zealand Acts can hardly be said to be conducive to the 
process of normalisation and integration into community life. 
The concern about the potential of abuse and unnecessary 
d . . f . h h d . t 
109 t epr1vat1on o rig ts as prompte awrier to sugges 
the complete abolition of planary guardianship. However, 
there may well be cases where a mentally disabled person 
may be so severely disabled as to be totally incapable 
of making any financial decision, for example a comatose 
or a severely retarded person. 
B. Limited Guardianshio 
Under plenary guardianship, a person legally became 
an "eternal child", deprived of all the rights which adult-
110 
hood bestows, regardless of his ability to exercise 
financial skills in some aspects of estate administration. 
However, it has been recognised that many disabled persons 
do not need such extensive protection; they may be competent 
37. 
in making decisions in some aspects, and in others, they may 
need a little encouragement or supervision. The increasing 
understanding that mental incapacity is situational and not 
necessarily a yes-no status, has led to the development of 
the concept of limited guardianship. 
With this limited form of guardianship, a person's 
incapacity (and consequent need for guardianship) is de-
termined for those functions he or she is unable to perform 
because of a disabling factor. A refined model of limited 
guardianship arrangement would only allow a guardian to 
facilitate (provide guidance and assistance) rather than 
1 b . . h. . d 111 mere y su stituting is own JU gment. A limited 
guardianship order must therefore specify exactly what 
areas of decision-making capacity is lacking and the 
corresponding provision for guardianship which is tailor-
suited to meet such needs arising out of the incapacity. 
There must also be a durational limit for the need of 
assistance and periodic reviews to ensure that guardian-
ship is to be terminated once it is shown that the person's 
training in those aspects formerly lacking has improved 
his ability to the point where he is capable of independent 
choice rather than until there is a "restoration of 
112 
competence". 
In comparison with p lena r y guardianship, limited 
guardianship offers a number of attractions.
113 First 
and foremost, it is a less restrictive form of protection 
in that it only gives those powers of decision-making which 
the ward is incapable of e xercising. The e x ercise of 
38. 
paternalistic guardianship resulting in "protective over-
kill" may not be in the best interest of the ward, no 
114 
matter how genuine motives may be. By allowing 
participation in the decision-making process under the 
guidance and supervision of a guardian, the disabled 
person can live under conditions which will encourage norm-
alisation and integration. These people will be assisted 
with the goal of helping themselves attain the position where 
they will no longer need guardianship. This would "promote" 
the value of autonomy, self-determination and individual 
dignity;and discourage societal interference and manipulation.
115 
Since a limited guardianship order can only be made after a 
due process determination of specific limitations in handling 
particular financial matters, a person enjoys the benefit of a 
presumption of competence. The use of limited guardianship 
will reduce the stigma of total incompetency as the disabled 
will be deprived of fewer decision-making responsibilities. 
While limited guardianship has many praiseworthy and 
conunendable objectives, it also has its fair share of 
criticisms. In a survey carried out in fourteen American 
States on members of the legal profession, conunents were 
elicited on this particular formulation of limited guardian-
h
. 116 
sip: 
Limited guardianship ... shall be designed 
to encourage the development of maximum self-
reliance and independence in the individual, 
and shall be ordered only to the extent 
necessitated by the individual's actual mental 
and adaptive limitations. [Such an individual] 
39. 
shall not be presumed to be incompetent and 
shall retain all legal and civil rights except 
those which by court order have been designated 
as legal disabilities .... 
Although a majority supported this particular phraseology 
of limited guardianship, those who criticised it
117 
emphasised that it would be a more costly kind of guardian-
ship procedure as well as confusing and vague. This may 
very well be so in comparison with the estate administration 
schemes established under the Mental Health Act 1969 and 
the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912. In response 
to that it has been suggested that "the simplicity and lack 
of financial expense involved in the procedures of those 
statutes tend to mask schemes whose costs are incalculably 
high in human terms, for such schemes often result in the 
unwarranted deprivation of personal rights 11 •
118 
Another criticism highlights the tremendous burden 
for judges or tribunals in tailor-suiting a guardianship 
order to the precise incapabilities of the disabled person. 
The result of this difficulty may lead to the tribunal to be 
restrictive in providing authority to the guardian and that 
guardians would be forced to come back to the tribunal 
. . t tl t . d h · h · 119 intermit en y o wi en t eir aut ority. 
Any tailor-made guardianship must not be a 
"straight jacket" as otherwise the time it 
will take to have the "jacket" altered may 
be too late. Also the intellectually handi-
capped person and his family should not be 
required to go through many hearings. 
4 0. 
Third parties may not risk entering into transactions 
with guardians or persons under limited guardianship where 
they do not know the exact distribution of powers between 
the guardian and the disabled person. Even if they were 
given a copy of the guardianship order, there may still be 
problems with interpreting the exact scope of powers if the 
order is fraught with ambiguities. Third parties and 
guardians need to know exactly where they stand if the 
guardianship arrangement is to be of any use. A contract-
ing party need to know whom they must deal with - the 
guardian or the ward. They need to know the exact spending 
limit of the ward and for what purposes without the 
guardian's consent, when a guardian's concurrent consent 
is needed or when only a guardian's consent will do.
120 
A scheme based on limited guardianship would be unworkable 
if parties have to go to and fro the guardianship tribunal 
to seek clarification of the original order. Apart from getting 
the tribunal to list right from the outset.the powers of 
th d · 
121 i' t b 11 f l t d f . ~ h e guar ian, may e equa y use u o e ine Lose 
. 122 
powers that are not available to the guardian. Moreover, 
with the passage of time, one can expect litigation or 
adjudication to define and clarify the language used in 
123 
guardianship orders. 
A possible negative effect of limited guardianship is 
that "the notion of 'a little incompetency' poses a danger 
to all citizens in that there would be an increased chance 
f b ' l ' 'bl f d' h' II 
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o eing e igi e or guar ians ip. This fear is 
unfounded unless one assumes that the standard of disability 
41. 
required for imposing plenary guardianship is any higher. 
Under the Mental Health Act 1969 and the Aged and Infirm 
Persons Protection Act 1912 which imposed a form of plenary 
guardianship, the requisite standard of disability is in 
fact . not higher than a limited guardianship standard that 
the writer has espoused. On the contrary, the New Zealand 
statutes by basing eligibility on labeling and categoris-
ation, has a wider scope than a limited guardianship scheme 
based on the quality of thought process of the ward.
125 
The only feature of limited guardianship that one 
can identify in the New Zealand legislation is the provision 
for the possibility of appointing a manager of the estate 
with the exception of such part or parts remaining in the 
uncontrolled possession of the protected person, or of the 
spouse or children of such person.
126 Whether in practice 
this discretion is seriously considered and exercised by the 
courts is a matter for speculation. Given the time and 
difficulty it takes to decide what portion of the estate 
could be safely left to the uncontrolled management of 
the disabled person, the Court is more likely to err on the 
side of over-protection by entrusting the whole estate into 
the hands of the manager. 
Having explained why the guardian should be given 
limited powers in accordance with the concept of limited 
guardianship, it is now proposed to examine the under-
lying principles of limited guardianship by which such 
powers and duties of guardians should be framed. 
42. 
First and foremost, the best interests of the dependent 
127 adult must be promoted. Guardians would have acted 
in the best interests of dependent persons if their guardian-
ship powers and duties are framed in such a way as to: 
1. encourage the normalisation and integration of 
disabled persons into the community by letting them 
act for themselves in areas where they are capable 
and allowing them to participate to the maximum 
128 extent in all decisions affecting their property. 
2. make the guardian act as an advocate of the disabled 
by ensuring that he gets all the benefits and services 
and is given all the rights he is entitled to. This 
may include bringing contract, tort or other actions 
. 1 . t f. . 1 t 129 in re ation o inancia ma ters. 
3. training and assisting the disabled person to become 
capable of coping with the difficulties he has in 
handling his financial affairs to a point where, the 
130 guardian becomes redundant. 
4. taking into consideration the opinions and wishes 
f h d . bl d h ' bl 131 o t e isa e person as muc as possi e. 
5. safe-guarding the physical health and personal 
integrity of the disabled. An estate manager's 
primary function is not to conserve (as the American 
term "conservator" suggests) property. The health 
and wellbeing of the person must come first, even if 
means exhausting the estate to get the best medical 
treatment. 
43. 
A guardian's powers and duties must be framed by 
weighing the need to protect the disabled person's property 
and the conflicting value of preserving his or her 
individual rights whereby a position is reached, giving 
maximum weight to the rights principles. Perhaps the 
greatest attribute a guardianship tribunal should possess 
is the ability to fine-tune the guardian's managerial 
responsibility and authority to such a degree that the 
ward retains most of his or her rights and at the same 
time is adequately protected. 
4 4. 
VI GUARDIANSHIP AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE FORMS 
OF PROTECTION 
The ultimate truth that one must come to terms with, 
is that guardianship can lead to a deprivation of legal 
rights and is therefore a highly restrictive alternative 
of looking after a person's needs. 
Consequently, if the guardian is to make 
possible the degree of autonomy, dignity 
and personal integrity necessary for success-
ful reintegration into the community, his role 
t h 1 1 t 1
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mus ave c ear y se imits. 
To that extent, guardianship is not a substitute for 
less restrictive forms of providing services and financial 
assistance to persons who cannot care for themselves. 
Guardianship only comes into play when there is a need to 
clearly· establish legal authority and responsibility to 
h d d . ' d d 133 ensure tat a equate care an protection are provi e . 
1. Citizen Advocacy 
All guardians should be advocates but not 
11 d h ld b d
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a a vocates are ors ou e guar ians. 
[P]eople sometimes speak in terms of a 
programme being either citizen advocacy or 
guardianship; the correct phrasing would 
distinguish between advocates in informal 
roles in comparison to advocates in formal 
(i.e. legal) roles. 135
 
Citizen advocacy is based on a one-to-one relationship 
• I 
45. 
between a capable volunteer (the advocate) and a disabled 
person (the protege or client), in which the advocate 
defends the rights and interests of the protege and provides 
practical or emotional reinforcement. The advocate in the 
informal role speaks for the protege when he is unable to 
speak for himself, assists and advises him in order that 
he is assured of all rights, whether legal or moral, and 
helps him discover avenues for self-expression. The 
advocate's involvement is such that he feels his own 
rights as a human being are violated if the rights of 
the protege are denied - even to the extent of initiating 
Court proceedings on his behalf.
136 In the context of 
estate administration, an advocate would ensure that a 
protege receives all social welfare benefits he or she 
is entitled to, help in budgeting, debt collecting, making 
a will, contacting a lawyer or Public Trustee and generally 
giving advice and emotional support. It must be borne in 
mind that true advocacy is concerned primarily with 
individual rights, nor service and, to be effective, it 
must avoid the conflict of interest which attach to 
. . 1· k' 137 protection, service or po icy ma ing. 
The advantage of a volunteer advocacy scheme over 
a remunerative one is that it reduces the possibility of 
a conflict of interest and has saving advantages to the 
government. Potential advocates will have to go through 
a screening procedure and be given special training by an 
advocacy agent. Advocates will need to learn the back-
ground and culture of their proteges and to effect the 
maximisation of normalisation, advocates should preferably 
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have a similar background. 
Although advocacy schemes have flourished in the 
United States and have attracted considerable attention 
in other countries, it has the possibility of subordinating 
the rights principle to the protection principle. 
It is easy for a volunteer advocate with 
the best of intentions, to become overly 
directive or to take advantage of the passivity 
or ignorance of the protege, to move into a 
dominant position to the point where unauthor-
ised decisions are being made by the advocate, 
or conversely, are being made by default.
138 
Although it is true that a limited guardianship scheme 
is equally vulnerable to protective over-kill, the safe-
guards under a guardianship scheme w~ich consist of 
reviews by and accountability to the tribunal will keep 
the guardian under control. 
Moreover, like all non-legal forms of assistance, 
citizen advocacy has no solution to the lack of legal 
authority to make and enforce the decisions that are 
sometimes necessary in the best interest of the disabled 
139 person. 
2 . Power of Attorney 
This is a formal instrument by which an authority 
is given by one person to another to act for him, whether 
for specific transactions, or to manage his affairs 
47. 
generally, for example, to receive debts, transfer land 
140 or sue. 
However, there are limitations to the use of such 
141 powers; a person cannot authorise to do what he may 
not legally do himself. Therefore a power of attorney 
given by a person who is of unsound mind at the time 
when he executes it is absolutely void. 142 A power of 
attorney which is validly created will also become void 
th . . l b . . 143 on e principa ecoming insane. The Instruments 
(Enduring Powers of Attorney) Act (Victoria) 1981 has 
remedied the former situation by making is possible to 
create a power of attorney for someone who is already a 
. . 1 . . . h . . bl 144 patient in a menta institution or ot erwise incapa e. 
The power is probably available to those with a mild 
degree of retardation. 
Apart from such limitations, a power of attorney 
would have been a less restrictive alternative to render 
assistance to a mentally disabled person. It allows the 
person to delegate his rights for only one specific 
transaction or a number of such transactions. Since the 
power is drafted in the privacy of a lawyer's office and 
does not involve judicial proceedings, there is no 
implication that the grantor is incompetent and therefore 
no stigma attached to it. 
3. Trusts 
As a less restrictive alternative, the use of a trust 
48. 
provides an effective device for estate management of 
mentall disabled persons without involving an adjudication 
of legal incapacity. This is particularly useful for 
those who,especially parents,are concerned with the needs 
of their handicapped charge after their deaths. Jeffries J.
145 
strongly recommends the Trust for the Intellectually Handi-
capped People (Inc.) which was specially designed to cater 
for such a need. For a contribution of one thousand 
five hundred dollars or more, the disabled person becomes 
a beneficiary and the Trustees in terms of the Trust Deed 
are under an obligation to secure services needed by the 
beneficiary after the death of the parents. The scheme 
allows for flexibility as it can be used alone or jointly 
with any other arrangement. Upon the death of the handi-
capped person, his individual trust fund can be applied to 
benefit others directly or become part of the general trust 
funds. The limitation of a trust device is that it does 
not take care of assets acquired by the disabled person 
himself which are not gifts from others. 
4. Other Alternatives 
As far as the day-to-day managerial needs of a 
disabled person are concerned, society seems adequately 
equipped without having to resort to formal guardian-
ship.146 A friend or relative of a disabled person can 
obtain a bank authority to assist with banking, become a 
representative payee for collecting social welfare benefits. 
The use of Court orders for single ratifications of specific 
4 9 • 
matters, for example, to enter into a contract, or for 
ordering the provisions of services can be equally less 
restrictive. 
Guardianship has a useful role in the whole range 
of alternatives only if it is limited to actual incapacities 
and seen as a supportive rather than a controlling mechanism. 
An expansion of community-oriented services would help to limit 
the use of guardianship, but in the meantime, guardianship 
is indispensable to promote normalisation in our society.
147 
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VII ADMINISTRATION OF A GUARDIANSHIP SCHEME 
A. Who Decides Whether a Person is in Need of Guardianship? 
The right to have control of one's property is a 
fundamental civil right and therefore any decision to 
restrict such right by way of property guardianship must be 
made by a competent adjudicating body. In New Zealand 
mental patients are automatically deprived of their rights 
to control property as soon as they are committed to mental 
hospitals.
148 There is, therefore, no hearing before an 
adjudicating body to determine the incapacity of the mental 
patient to manage property. The condition of needing 
hospitalisation is convenientlY,although wrongly presumed 
to be synonymous with the condition of "commercial" incom-
petence. This automatic form of guardianship represents a 
serious violation of the civil rights of many committed 
patients in New Zealand. 
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Report that: 
It has been noted by the Victoria 
[a]ny other method of determining incapacity 
which falls short of a proper judicial or quasi-
judicial inquiry is unacceptable. The majority 
believe that there is no short hand method of 
determining incapacity. It is not correct for 
instance, to conclude that all persons who are 
patients are in need of estate administration. 
Some persons who are patients are clearly capable 
of managing their financial affairs, while a great 
many who are patients are in need of estate 
administration. 
Having established the need for a determination of incapacity 
51. 
to be made before a competent body of hearing it is now 
proposed to examine what form such adjudicating body 
should take. 
1. An administrative tribunal or a Court 
The Victoria Report favours the South Australian style 
of adjudication by an administrative tribunal rather 
than a court, although it acknowledged that in most 
jurisdictions the court is the body which decides on 
d . h' 150 guar ians ip. Three advantages of a tribunal 
151 
model are advanced in support of the proposal. 
First, a tribunal need not be bound by rigid courtroom 
procedures required in a court hearing. This will be 
a cost-saving as it is likely to be a lot less expensive 
than a court hearing. Moreover, the flexibility 
of the tribunal hearing will eliminate the excessive 
delays that a court system would produce, even in 
relatively clear cut cases. 
Secondly, a tribunal is likely to be more accessible 
than a court. This is not only due to the less 
expensive procedure of a tribunal hearing but also 
because of its informal "coffee table" atmosphere. 
A mentally disabled person would feel more at ease 
here than in the court room where many would relate 
to the court procedure and authority figures in such 
a way that makes them look more handicapped than 
they actually are. Moreover, members of t he di€abled 
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person's family and those involved in guardianship 
matters feel more inclined to participate in the 
informal tribunal hearings. 
Thirdly, a tribunal places the decision making power 
in the hands of persons with the relevant expertise. 
for example, a registered psychologist, an accountant 
or person with experience in looking after mentally 
disabled persons. There would not be many judges 
who have much experience in dealing with mental 
disability. 
The arguments in favour of the Court as the adjud-
icating body run as follows: 
First, a court hearing system need not necessarily 
be more costly than that of an administrative tribunal. 
This is because the court system is an already 
existing structure .unlike the administrative tribunal 
which would require resources and funds to bring it 
into existence. 
Secondly, a court hearing can be just as accessible 
as a tribunal hearing. To minimise procedural rigidity 
the court can always be given the discretion to dispense 
with rules of evidence and be allowed to receive any 
. d . h. k f. 152 evi ence it tins it. Also, going to court need 
not be an intimidating experience for the disabled 
person who is usually not familiar with the formality 
of a judicial proceeding. Such hearings could always 
be held in the Family Court where the informal atmosphere 
.. 
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will put the parties at ease. The Family Courts 
Act 1980 specifically provides that all proceedings 
in the Family Court shall be conducted in a way as 
to avoid unnecessary informality and that neither 
Judges nor counsel appearing in that court shall 
. 153 wear wigs or gowns. 
ThiEdly, although an administrative tribunal consist-
ing of mental health experts may appear to be better 
than judges in deciding issues of mental incapacity, 
the Family Court is, in fact, a better forum for 
such matters. The issue of guardianship cannot 
be viewed in isolation; rather, it should be seen 
in the context of the family because it would nearly 
1 . 1 . f f · 1 1 · h · 154 a ways invo ve issues o ami y re ations ips. 
The Family Court with its excellent reputation and 
accessible nature would be "ideally suited" for handling 
d . h' 155 guar ians ip matters. Moreover, the mental health 
expertise provided by the administrative tribunal 
could always be incorporated into the Family Court 
system by way of a multi-disciplinary team of experts 
. 155A appointed by the Family Court to carry out a 
prehearing examination of the proposed ward. It is 
common for almost all limited guardianship proposals 
or laws to have a multidisciplinary team consisting of 
1 h 1 h f . 1 156 h es the men ta ea t pro essiona s. T e team assess 
nature and severity of the person's disability and reports 
to the court . However, such an assessment is only a 
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prehearing evaluation so that the court itself will 
have to determine whether the person is in fact 
incompetent and in need of guardianship, taking into 
account the evaluation report. The function of the 
court in conducting its own judicial findings of fact 
must not be totally dependent on the team's evaluation 
as to make the whole exercise a rubber-stamping of 
expert opinion. Alternatively, the Family Court 
could build up its own expertise by creating a mental 
health division within itself.
157 
An adversarial or inquiry model? 
Having decided that the Family Court is preferred to 
an administrative tribunal in determining guardianship 
issues, the question now is whether the Court should 
conduct proceedings in an adversarial or inquiry (fact 
finding) style. 
The adversary system is discredited by the Victoria 
Report for the following reasons.
158 The difficult 
issue of guardianship necessitates the gathering of 
information by a body with an active fact finding 
ability. The adversarial model is inappropriate 
as the adjudicating body cannot call witnesses or 
weigh up evidence which is not put before it by either 
party. It must be noted, however, that the Family 
Court which hears proceedings of an adversarial nature 
can still be empowered to receive any evidence it thinks 
55. 
fit.159 
The adversary procedure has also been criticised for 
tending to suggest that the person who initiates the 
guardianship hearing is in conflict with the subject 
of the guardianship hearing. This is undesirable as 
it can only serve to polarise the parties and exacerbate 
the situation. Also, those who appear before a court 
hearing have to speak through their lawyers. Mentally 
disabled persons are likely to encounter great difficulty 
in instructing their representatives. It seems that 
all these problems can be easily solved by an active 
fact finding tribunal. 
The proponents of a judicial hearing in an adversarial 
setting based their arguments on the premise that 
because a determination to impose guardianship auto-
matically entails a restriction of rights, the subject 
of the guardianship hearing must be given the right 
to challenge it. Traditionally, guardianship has 
been viewed in terms of a parent-child model.
160 A 
guardian's duty is to look after the person or property 
of the ward until he has regained his capacity like a 
child attains his majority. Since it was protective 
and thought to work in the best interest of the ward, 
informality became the hallmark of guardianship proceed-
ings. Procedural safeguards were dispensed with, and 
the hearing became non-adversarial with the judge's 
role converted from one of an adjudicator between 
conflicting parties to a fact finding inquisitor in 
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search of the "truth". There was no need to have two 
opposing parties confronting each other in court because 
there was only one person's interest to be served - the 
potential subject of a guardianship order. 
The petitioner who filed for the guardian-
ship could not"win" because he had nothing 
to gain (in the sense that litigants "win" a 
trial). Even if the alleged incompetent 
"lost" the hearing, he in reality "won" by 
. . th . f d. 161 gaining e protection o a guar ian. 
These traditional views of guardianship based on the 
parent-child model which have been built into the inquiry 
162 
procedure of the Victoria Report can be criticised 
on several grounds. First, it is important to recognise 
that although it is said that there is only one interest 
to be served: that of the alleged incomptent's; in 
reality, other competing interests exist. The state 
has an interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens 
and this clashes with the disabled person's interest in 
preserving his rights and independence. Service 
providers have their own bureaucratic interests; a 
guardianship order may well be used to serve their own 
ends. For example, hospitals and nursing homes may 
initiate property guardianship in order to facilitate 
debt collection rather than to fulfil the individual 
163 needs of the proposed ward. Relatives who apply 
for guardianship usually have expectancies of a vested 
interest in the disabled person's estate and they are 
57. 
usually given priority in being appointed as guardians. 
To have a hearing that is non-adversarial would be to 
' h 1' I 1 , t' 164 ignore t e app icant s u terior mo ives. 
Therefore, it is important to realise that there are 
conflicting interests involved in a guardianship matter. 
The welfare of the disabled person is not the sole consid-
eration; not everyone is concerned about protecting the 
rights of the disabled. The disabled's basic civil 
rights are at risk while the applicant has little to 
lose. In such a conflict situation the safeguards 
of an adversary system are the only protection a dis-
abled person has against the powerful hand of the state. 
It is submitted that if New Zealand were to introduce 
new guardianship laws, the adversary system should be 
part and parcel of the new scheme. The inquiry model 
is inadequate in protecting the rights of the subject 
of a guardianship hearing from being unnecessarily 
restricted. 
B. Who May Initiate Guardianship Proceedings? 
There are two considerations in the area of access-
ibility of guardianship services. On one hand, there has 
been a constant warning that open-ended guardianship laws 
will be subverted and abused by relatives and others in 
t . th . 1 f . 
16 S promo ing eir own se -interests. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that by restricting the class of applicants, 
there may be a danger that many disabled persons are never 
58. 
brought to the attention of the Court and consequently, 
never receive the benefits of an estate administrator. 
In practise, the problem is not so clear-cut. A survey 
of the law of North Carolina illustrates that an open-
ended law may also reduce accessibility: 
One of the great strengths of the North Carolina 
law is that anyone can be a petitioner. However, 
this great strength is also a major weakness. 
Most people see the role of petitioner belonging 
to someone else. If no one petitions, there'll 
obviously be no limited guardianships. Although 
everyone should consider the option of petitioning 
as the law allows, it would be advantageous if one 
group could be encouraged to view this as their 
. ' b'l' 166 primary responsi i ity. 
To prevent the inaccessibility of the benefits of guardian-
ship to those who are in need, it is suggested that the 
class of eligible applicants should consist of the disabled 
person, the personal guardian, the existing property guard-
ian of "an adult interested in the welfare of a partially 
disabled or disabled person 11 • 167 The flood-gates argument 
against such a liberal criterion cannot be sustained in 
practice as the formality of the procedures and the require-
ment of the applicant in discussing the application with an 
d . . . ff. f h d. h . h 
168 · 11 a ministrative o icer o t e guar ians ip sc eme wi 
discourage frivolous filings. More importantly, applications 
motivated by malice or for purposes of harassment can be 
reduced by requiring that applications cannot be made by 
individuals, unless it can be shown that they may be "adversely 
59. 
affected by [the] lack of effective management of [the 
disabled person's] property or affairs 11 •
169 The application 
has to be made on oath, must include all facts and information 
explaining why guardianship is needed, and explain the 
applicant's relationship with the disabled person. 
In New Zealand the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection 
Act 1912, allows relations, the Public Trustee and "any 
other person who shall adduce proof of circumstances which 
in the opinion of the Court make it proper that such other 
person should make the application" to apply for a protection 
order.
170 Such a fairly liberal criterion will ensure 
accessibility and should be retained in any future , 
guardianship ~cherne provided that such a new scheme also 
incorporate the procedµral safeguards ~reposed by the writer.
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C. Role of the Public Advocate 
A vital function in any guardianship scheme is that· of 
general oversight and coordination of all forms of service 
deliveries within the guardianship framework. This essen-
tially "watchdog" or ombudsman role is best performed by an 
agency which is independent of the service deliveries which 
the guardianship scheme provid~s. The potential dangers 
in having a watchdog agency which is merely an extension of 
the functions of a main service delivery body, for example, 
the Health Department, must be stressed. Such an extended 
agency would be more than likely to perform its functions to 
60. 
suit the objectives of its parent organisation rather than 
in the best interest of the disabled person who is subject 
to guardianship. Even if it wanted to promote the best 
interests of the disabled, it can only do so to the extent 
that the parental body which controls all resource allocation, 
allows it to. Under such conditions, the watchdog agency 
would be more concerned about its bureaucratic survival 
rather than the safeguard of the disabled person's rights. 
Not only must a watchdog agency be independent of other 
service delivery bodies, it must not also act as a guardian 
in any case. A guardian cannot be expected to be an effect-
ive watchdog of itself. The Dependent Adult Act 1976 which 
combined the ombudsman function with the function of a 
guardian of last resort into one body,
172 is adopted by the 
Victoria Report. The reason for such an amalgamation being 
an expressed concern about the proliferation of government 
bureaucracies if the two functions are to be divided between 
t b d
. 173 wo o ies. 
The approach proposed by the American Bar Association 
is by far the best in ensuring the proper administration and 
. . f th d . h . h l 7 4 d supervision o e guar ians ip sc eme. It suggeste an 
agency called the Guardianship/Conservatorship Oversight 
Commission which is independent of all government bodies. 
To save the cost of creating another state social service 
agency, an organisation of a network of private citizens to 
form the Oversight Commission and render the required services 
on an as-needed basis is to be set up. The added advantage 
of such an agency is that it can offer more individualised 
61. 
service than can be provided by a government employee who 
has to go through a substantial caseload. On top of that, 
it does not assume the role of a guardian.
175 The broad 
functions of the Oversight Commission are two-fold: 
First, identifying individuals who are qualified to 
serve on multidisciplinary evaluation teams which provide 
expert testimony to the Court and preparing a list of such 
individuals. 
Second, creating a pool of individuals and entities to 
provide guardianship and conservatorship services, monitoring 
the appointment process to prevent any form of political 
patronage, providing training programmes for guardians and 
conservators, conducting investigations and hearings where 
there are complaints about multidisciplinary evaluation 
teams or corruption in the appointment of volunteers.
176 
The educative function of the Public Advocate in the 
Victoria Report in promoting community involvement in 
deci~ion making is commendable.
177 The Public Guardian of 
Alberta explained such a task in the following words :
178 
To be effective, guardianship must become 
part of the fabric of life of the community. 
It must be viewed as the last resort of the 
continuous protective services available to 
dependent persons. Guardianship must also 
be seen as a family and community responsib-
ility before being perceived as a responsib-
ility of the state. The role of the state 
in this model, is to provide the enabling 
legislation and the backup resources required 
to encourage the suitable family and community 
62. 
persons to become guardians. 
The Public Advocate will have to keep a high public 
profile and play an active outreach or proactive as opposed 
to a passive or reactive role. The latter approach as 
taken by the North Carolina legislation is doomed to failure 
if clients are apprehensive. 179 The Public Advocate will 
give advice and information, and make referrals to other 
community service alternatives. In particular, it should 
publicise and encourage the development of Citizen Advocacy 
h . h . 1 . t. 1 t. d · h · 180 w ic is a ess restric ive a terna ive to guar ians ip. 
The other important function of the Public Advocate 
is to provide independent advice to the appropriate Minister 
regarding the effectiveness of existing services and the 
need for legislative reform. The unique position of the 
Public Advocate in being able to perceive the overall picture 
of community services for the disabled will enhance his 
d . . 181 a visory capacity. 
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VIII PROCEDURE IN GUARDIANSHIP SCHEME 
Having decided that the Court is the appropriate adjud-
icating body in guardianship matters
182 it is necessary to 
examine how the due process requirements of a judicial 
procedure can be applied in the context of property guardian-
ship. At this juncture it is pertinent to be reminded 
of the nature of guardianship and the dire implications 
of having been declared incompetent. 
Guardianship is a legal relationship in 
which guardians become substitute decision 
makers for wards who are unable to take 
care for themselves. Although the state has 
a significant interest in protecting its 
incapacitated citizens, imposition of a 
guardianship directly limits the ward's 
basic rights of liberty and autonomy. Thus 
the power to impose guardianships must be 
employed cautiously, and proceedings for 
determining whether an individual requires 
a guardian must conform with due process 
. 183 
requirements. 
The California Supreme Court compared the consequences of 
guardianship to incarceration: "a conservatee must be 
subject to greater control of his or her life than one 
, d f , II 184 conv1cte o a crime. It is a misconception to regard 
property guardianship as involving a less significant loss 
of rights without any interference of civil rights as the 
Uniform Probate Code
185 has done by requiring a full trial 
for the appointment of a guardian of the person and a shorter 
hearing with less procedural safeguards for the appointment 
64. 
186 
of a guardian of property. That rights in property, 
like the right to speak and the right to travel are basic 
civil rights has long been recognised.
187 The safeguards 
of due process must, therefore, apply equally to all forms 
of guardianship hearing. 
A. Applications 
To prevent trivial or malicious allegations, the 
application will have to be made under oath to allow the 
prosecution of applicants who knowingly sur~l;r~ misleading 
. f t' 188 in orma ion. Apart from standard informational 
requirements, like the names, ages and addresses of various 
parties who will be involved or presumed to have sufficient 
interests in the hearing to receive notice, the application 
should include the following: 
1. the nature of the alleged disability; 
2. the particular needs for estate administration 
resulting from the disability; 
3. the particular type of service and assistance 
required, for example, plenary guardianship, 
1 . . d d . h . 
. . 189 imite guar ians ip or training programmes; 
Reasons must be given as to why the service 
sought is the least restrictive alternative 
available; 
4. the limitation of rights requested; 
5. the specific powers sought by the property 
guardian; 
6. the requested term of guardianship; 
7. it should be optional to have the application 
. d b f .. h 1 . d 1 90 accornn anie v a reuort o_ a p s y c o og1st or actor; 
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8. a statement that the applicant has discussed 
with the officer who is supposed to explain 
the effects of the order requested and to explore 
the alternatives available; 191 
9. the consent of the proposed guardian if he or she 
. t th 1· 192 is no e app icant. 
While it is desirable to have specific requirements 
for making an application in order to prevent any abuse, 
it is equally important that these requirements do not 
present an obstacle course for the appropriate applicant. 
The requirement of a report written by a professional person 
confirming the need for guardianship is a common feature 
of guardianship legislation. Such a report should not be 
compulsory as the cost of such a service may discourage 
people from lodging an aplication. Moreover the . opinion 
of such a professional person will usually be no more 
valuable than that of a non-professional person. 193 
Any greater specificity in the application procedure 
than that suggested by the writer would undoubtedly be too 
194 complicated and confusing for the ordinary person. 
The application procedure is only meant to show the Court 
that the applicant has made out a prima facie case. To 
require more conclusive evidence, for example, a professional 
report, would be to transfer the actual hearing to the 
application. stage. In addition, the fact that the applicant 
is expected to bear the cost of the application will serve 
as a deterrent against frivolous claims. 
There is no provision under the Mental Health Act 1969 
66. 
for the making of an application for guardianship because 
every person who is committed to a psychiatric hospital is 
automatically put under the property guardianship of the 
P bl . 195 h h . . d h u ic Trustee. T ere are, owever, provisions un er t e 
Act governing the application or request procedure for the 
't t f . 1 . . . 196 cornmi men o persons into menta institutions. 
Before any person can become a protected person under 
the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 there must 
first be an application made by petition to the High Court 
f t t . d 197 h d or a pro ec ion or er. However, t e Act oes not state 
any specific requirements governing the making of such 
application; all it does is to list the persons who are 
entitled to make the application. 198 
B. Notices 
After the Court has set a date for hearing, it should 
serve notice of the rights of the parties, the date, time, 
place, purpose and possible consequences of the hearing on 
various people. Alternatively, notice of an intended guard-
ianship can be effected by the applicant serving a copy of 
his or her application to various people. 
There are two primary considerations in the area of 
notice. First, sufficient notice of a guardianship applic-
ation must be given to as many interested persons to prevent 
persons from being streamlined into guardianship, Second, 
if such notice is freely distributed, it may cause additional 
67. 
bureaucratic delay and also create astigmatism of the person 
subject to the application.
199 
The various guardianship legislation and proposals 
are in agreement as to the core group of people who should 
receive notice. Beyond that group, they may differ as to 
who should be entitled to notice.
200 It is suggested that 
the following people or entities should be notified: 
1. the subject of the proposed guardianship; 
2. the applicant (where the notice is to be 
given by the Court); 
3. the spouse of the subject of the proposed 
guardianship; 
_4. the parents of the subject of the proposed 
guardianship, or the person who has his care 
and cus todv; 
5. the existing personal guardian and/or property 
guardian, if there are any; 
6. the proposed property guardian; 
7. the Public Advocate; 
8. the Public Trustee; 
9. any interested person who, in the opinion of the 
Court should be notified. 
Apart from those stated above, there is no compulsion to give 
notice to others, like possible heirs of the subject of the 
hearing, his or her other relatives, persons with a financial 
interest. These people would probably fall under category 9 
as "interested people". There is no proper provision for 
the service of notices under the Aged and Infirm Persons 
68. 
Protection Act 1912. The Act only requires that where an 
application for a protection order is made by any other person 
than the alleged disabled, the petition must be served to the 
latter unless the Court directs otherwise.
201 
The notice should be given as soon as possible to allow 
sufficient time for the alleged disabled person to organise 
a meaningful defence. There may be a need to call independent 
expert opinion to challenge the alleged incapacity. Some 
of the suggested periods of time for the service of notice 
202 
prior to the hearing are as follows: at least ten days, 
203 204 
seven to fourteen days, at least fourteen days, or an 
unstated period.
205 A three to ten day notice seems quite 
short when the first people to whom the subject of the hearing 
is likely to turn to, his family, are likely to be the 
applicants.
206 A period of at least fourteen days is there-
fore more meaningful. 
The mode of service of the notice must be that which is 
most likely to give actual notice. First, there must be 
personal service to the person alleged to be in need of 
assistance. Second, such notice must be more than just mere 
contact, but rather one that requires understanding and the 
. k h . 207 h d. opportunity to ma ea c oice. Event e or inary person 
is unfamiliar with words like "guardian", 'estate administrator" 
or "limited guardianship", the alleged disabled person will 
have even more difficulty grasping such concepts. 
[T]he notice given is unlikely to be very 
informative or useful since the notice 
prescribed by most statutes is a notice of 
hearing; the recipient thereby learns that 
a hearing on the petition will be held on a 
69. 
certain date. He or she will not be advised 
of the serious legal and personal implications 
of the determination to be made, the importance 
of countering the allegations, the standard by 
which competency will be judged, the evidence 
to be introduced, or rights to legal represent-
ation and a jury trial, even if the latter is 
guaranteed by the statute. In those jurisdict-
ions where a copy of the petition accompanies 
the notice of hearing, the prospective ward 
will still not be apprised of the facts which 
underlie the petition, or which actions he or 
she will be called upon to defend, because the 
petition itself merely parrots the grounds 
ennunciated in the statute.
208 
The notice must also be in the language that is most 
meaningful to the alleged disabled person: 
While some individuals either because of youth 
or disability, will not be able to grasp the 
meaning of the notice no matter how well it is 
explained, most will be able to understand it 
if explained properly. For example, an 
explanation of the notice in English to a 
respondent who understands only Spanish, -Vietnamese 
or Navajo is of little use whether or not that 
individual is a partially disabled person. 
Attempting to communicate verbally or through 
a standard printed form to someone who can 
only understand sign language or read Braille, 
or couching an explanation in technical legal 
terms is equally futile. Yet, in too many 
instances, the subjects of intervention proceedings 
fail to receive proper notice, not because they 
are unable to understand, but because no-one 
had made the effort to present the information 
in a manner that is comprehensible to them. By 
70. 
specifying that the notice must be in the 
language, mode of communication and terms 
which the subject of the intervention pro-
ceedings is most likely to understand, this 
209 
provision mandates such an effort be made. 
The proposed legislation for New Zealand allows service to 
be dispensed with where either the disabled person is incap-
able of understanding the nature and consequences of the 
hearing or that service would have a detrimental effect on 
210 
that person. However, it has been submitted that there 
should never be any provision for the dispensation of notice 
even if it could be shown that it would have a harmful effect 
211 
on the person served. The reason being that a wrongful 
imposition of guardianship would result in a severe restriction 
of the person's rights to liberty. Rather than allowing 
dispensation of notices where there may be possible detrimental 
effect on the person served, it would be better to allow the 
Court to appoint a counsellor to explain to the disabled person 
h t th t . d h t d . h . h · · 1 
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w a e no ice means an w a a guar 1ans ip earing invo v es. 
Another reason why there should be no allowance for dispensatio n 
of notices is because "experience with statutes al l owing a 
dispensation of these rights shows that the one-sided nature 
of the evidence used to support dispensation often results 
213 
in its frequent and unwarranted occurrence". 
c. Prehearing Ex amination 
Common to almost all limited guardianship laws or 
proposals is the provision for an evaluation of the subject 
of the guardiansh ip proceedings by a multidisciplinary team 
71. 
of mental health professionals, usually including a physician, 
psychiatrist and social worker.
214 The result of the examin-
ation will be in the form of a written report submitted to the 
Court, applicant and the person examined. The main objective 
of the report is to make available to the Court, independent 
expert testimony, so that the Court can make the correct 
decision. This report takes on even greater significance 
in view of the variety of dispositional choices available and 
215 
the need to select the least restrictive alternative one. 
The criticism against such an evaluation is one that is 
expressed against every new legal mechanism introduced -
excessive cost. The American Bar Association suggested that 
the Court should have the obligation of obtaining and bearing 
216 
the costs of such reports. While this may overcome a 
major financial obstacle that the applicant or the alleged 
disabled would have to face, its net result would be to shift 
the burden on the taxpayers. 
Bureaucratic delay and "red tape" is another problem 
that every administrative set-up seems to have to grapple 
with. A few attorneys concluded that the procedure was too 
much like civil commitment and some anticipated "great delays" 
217 
and unnecessary crowded Court dockets. It is ironical that 
such an involved evaluation procedure should be criticised 
when the principal objection to traditional guardianship 
procedure is that it is too quick and insufficiently concerned 
with the details of the disability of the proposed ward.
218 
In order to cut cost and delay, it could be suggested 
72. 
that such formal evaluation be dispensed with where the 
appointment of a guardian was uncontested. This would no 
doubt add to the expediency of railroading people into 
guardianship. One wonders how a partially disabled person 
can actually give a valid consent to a guardianship where 
no medical evidence has been adduced. The only safe thing 
to do is to require compulsory evaluation in all cases. 
There is no provision in present New Zealand law for 
such a prehearing examination and it is therefore suggested 
that future legislation on guardianship should make provision 
for such an examination. 
D. Right of Presence at Hearing 
It may be in the self-interest of the applicant to 
convince the Court to waive presence by pointing to the fact 
that, the alleged disabled is bed-ridden or easily disturbed 
. 11 219 emotiona y. Professor Frolik argued that there is no 
reason to almost automatically make the hearing ex parte in 
220 all such cases. The presence of the subject of the 
hearing could be beneficial in several ways. He or she may 
be able to enlighten counsel as to the reasons why certain 
evidence of his or her unusual behaviour put forward by the 
applicant is not the result of mental incapacity. Bearing 
in mind the conclusionary nature of psychiatric reports 
and their questionable reliability, it would be more helpful 
if the alleged ward is actually present, so that the Court 
can judge for itself, the extent of mental incapacity. The 
presence of the proposed ward would also accord with the 
principle of normalisation and minimum intervention. 
73. 
If a primary goal of the guardianship programme 
is encouragement of self-reliance and independence 
on the part of the ward, then these statutory 
provisions requiring the presence of the ward 
at the hearing and direct consultation with the 
ward have much to recommend them. Through his act-
ive participation in the proceedings, the ward 
has an opportunity to view first hand, the legal 
process that will so directly affect his life, 
to express his opinions concerning this process, 
and to exercise a degree of control - however 
11 h . 
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sma - over is own estiny. 
The rules of natural justice requires any subject of a 
judicial hearing, be given the right to presence unless he 
h · h · h 
222 h f · d' c ooses to waive t e rig t. T ere ore in every guar 1an-
ship proceedings where counsel demands that his client be 
present, the hearing shall be stopped until that issue has 
been resolved.
223 
It is unfortunate that the Aged and Infirm Persons 
Protection Act 1912 provides no guarantee for such a right 
to the subject of a hearing for a protection order. Not 
only must the future New Zealand guardianship scheme include 
such a right, it must also make no allowance for dispensation 
f h . h
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o sue a rig t. 
E. Representation at Hearing 
Procedural due process entitles a subject of a hearing 
to be represented by a lawyer or a guardian ad litem. Within 
the American states, fifteen provide for representation by 
counsel, seven provide for appointment of a guardian ad 
litem, five permit for both, two permit one or the other, 
74. 
and thirteen direct a lawyer to take on both roles.
225 
The two diverse roles of counsel and of a guardian ad litem 
are contrasted as such:
226 
The role of counsel is to serve as a 
zealous advocate of the legal interests 
of his or her client but not to determine 
those interests. The function of the 
guardian ad litem is to assist individuals 
to determine their interests and, if they are 
incapable of doing so, of acting in their 
stead. 
The allocation of the two functions into two separate 
individuals will ensure a better protection of the rights 
of individuals involved in guardianship proceedings. 
[Al lawyer attempting to function as both 
guardian ad litem and legal counsel is cast 
in the quandary of acting as both attorney 
and client, to the detriment of both capacities 
and the possible jeorpardising of the infant's 
t h d • bl d I ] • t 2 2 7 or t e isa e persons interes s. 
There are serious reasons why counsel should act as an 
adversarial advocate rather than as a promoter of the best 
f h 1
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interests o t e c ient. First, counsel's role should 
be like that of a criminal defence lawyer who serves society 
best by an active, adversarial defence of his client. 
Guardianship entails the loss of independence and civil 
. d b h . . 229 rights, an can e worse tan a conviction. A lawyer 
who is allowed to promote the best interest of his client may 
75. 
decide that he or she is in need of guardianship although 
the client thinks otherwise or expresses no opinion, and 
although there are other least restrictive alternatives 
available. In such a case, counsel would be reluctant to 
challenge medical evidence introduced by the guardianship 
applicant. The cost of guardianship to the unwilling ward 
is enough to require society to prove its case against 
vigorous opposition from counsel. 
Second, a legal advocate cannot or may not formulate a 
tactical ~Mnoeuvre in Court that accurately promotes the 
best interests of the client. 
[C]ourts will experience great difficulty 
separating out those lawyers who have acted 
in a manner they considered consistent with 
the best interests of the client from those 
who have acquiesed in coITIITlitment simply as 
f ' . d. k 2
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Third, suoordinating the adversarial role to the best 
interests role can lend itself to the creation of a situation 
where counsel's presence is a mere procedural formality. 
More importantly, if counsel were to act in the best 
interest of the client, he or she would have to ascertain 
the mental ability of the client. Counsel is a legal pro-
fessional whose expertise in legal matters does not include 
the skills to decide whether his client is incompetent or that 
guardianship is the least restrictive alternative available. 
It is in the best interest of society and the subject of 
a guardianship proceeding that counsel should, in all cases, 
76. 
assume a zealous adversarial role free from the responsibil-
ities of a guardian ad litem. 
In order to promote the principles of normalisation and 
least restrictive intervention, disabled persons should at 
all times possible, decide for themselves what their best 
interests are. It is only when a disabled person cannot 
determine those interests without assistance nor has no 
existing guardian that a guardian ad litem should be appoint-
ed.231 Such a person should encourage the person he or she 
is acting for, to participate in all decision making to the 
. 232 maximum extent. The extent to which a guardian ad litem 
may exceed his advisory jurisdiction to act as a substitute 
decision maker in giving instructions to counsel, should be 
233 
indicated by the appointment order made by the Court. 
The granting of such a wide power to the guardian ad litem 
has been criticised for undercutting the zealous adversarial 
role of counsel, as the guardian ad litem in promoting the 
best interest of the client may consent to the evidence of 
incapacity presented by the applicant; the right to counsel 
ld 1 b h d 
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wou on y ea s a ow protection. 
The Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 contains 
no provision for the right of the proposed protected person 
to have any form of representation. The current New Zealand 
proposals suggest that the court be empowered to appoint 
counsel to represent the person at the guardianship hearing.
235 
However, for reasons already discussed, the disabled person 
should also be represented by a guardian ad litem whose 
function is to assist the disabled person to determine what 
their best interests are. 
77. 
F. Right to Closed Hearing 
The case against a closed hearing is argued along the 
line that it may produce "clubhouse justice".
236 The 
"cleansing effects of exposure and accountability" will 
ensure that judicial decisions are of the highest quality.
237 
An open hearing will serve an educative function in famil-
iarising the public with the guardianship hearing procedures. 
The constitutional importance of an open hearing cannot be 
ignored - justice is done as well as seen to be done. On the 
other hand closed hearings are justified because they avoid 
the humiliating spectacle and stigmatization a subject might 
suffer in discussing their personal difficulties in public.
238 
The Victoria mode1
239 is in favour of hearings which 
are generally open to the public with members of the press 
allowed but prohibited from relasing information which would 
likely reveal the identify of the subject. The other members 
of the public are subject to the discretion of the Tribunal 
to exclude some or all of them where their presence may be 
detrimental to the best interest of the subject. Ultimately, 
the decision would be reached weighing the two competing public 
interests in the scrutiny of the judicial process and the 
need to keep the privacy of citizens intact. 
The American Bar Association adopts a middle position 
by giving the subject the right to close proceedings to the 
public, except that the Court may permit persons with a 
legitimate interest in the matter unless the subject specif-
. 11 b' 240 ica yo Jects. rt· is submitted that the same approach 
78. 
should be adopted for the proposed guardianship scheme 
in New Zealand. 
G. Evidential Matters 
The report of the multidisciplinary team of professional s 
would form the backbone of evidence that the court would rely 
on in giving its decision. However, both parties to the 
hearing should be allowed to challenge the report by active 
cross examination or by bringing their own expert evidence. 
Observations by all witnesses on the issue of the need 
for guardianship should be presented in person before the 
court. The dangers of judicial decisions based upon the 
written evidence of persons who are not present at the actual 
hearings to justify their opinions and who therefore cannot 
be cross-examined are all too well known to go unnoticed. The 
court should have a power to compel any person to appear before 
it and present oral evidence. This power would be exercised 
b h b . f h h
 . 241 
upon a request y t e su Ject o t e earing. 
The analogy of a guardianship proceeding is that of a 
criminal proceeding is drawn on the basis that both involve 
the possible deprivation of fundamental rights and also 
h . . 1 t' 
242 h . 
because oft e ensuing socia sigma. Te American Bar 
Association in recognising the great social costs of making 
erroneous factual determinatior.s, has required a petitioner 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject is disabled 
or partially disabled and that the order sought is the 
1 . . 1 . ·1 
bl 243 east restrictive a ternative avai a e. McLaughlin 
79. 
in his well publicised book is of the opinion that there is 
no need for proof beyond reasonable doubt if there are 
sufficient opportunities for the person who is the subject 
of the application to defend himself.
244 One would tend 
to agree with his view as it seems anomalous that the American 
Bar Association
245 while proposing a criminal standard of 
proof should adopt the rules of civil procedure and rules of 
evidence applicable in civil cases for all other aspects of 
the hearing. Moreover, the heavy burden of proof required 
may have negative effects of inaccessibility and under-
protection. Potential applicants may be discouraged by the 
overwhelming evidential hurdle that has to be overcome. 
This would result in the guardianship mechanism being under-
utilised. Even if the actual number of applications are 
not reduced, their rate of success would be minimal. This 
unduly harsh standard would in turn result in persons who 
need protection being unnecessarily deprived of guardianship. 
The provision for a guardian ad litem and counsel together 
with other due process rights should adequately protect the 
subject from any miscarriage of justice. On top of that, a 
stricter enforcement of the balance of probabilities standard 
1 'd 
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wou d provi e extra protection. 
H. Findings and Order of the Court 
The order which record the judicial findings of fact 
must spell out specific matters such as whether the subject 
is mentally disabled; the nature and extent of disability; 
80. 
the legal rights he retains; the extent to which the 
decision making power is transferred to the guardian 
(including how his authority is to be exercised, how 
the ward's needs are to be met, and how his needs are to 
be financed) ; the duration of the order; the security 
to be provided the guardian; and whether the guardian 
247 
is the guardian of the person, property or both. 
The court order should be based on the findings of 
actual behaviour and not on speculation of future behaviour.
248 
The framing of a court order with great particularity and 
detail has been predicted to give rise to a "never ending 
controversy" between the guardian, ward and court. Further 
more there will be extensive court work in interpreting the 
249 
order unless the guardian could exercise broad powers. 
Such difficulties are not unexpected and it would be all too 
convenient to point to these problems as justifications for 
. f 1 d. h. 
250 h the existence o p enary guar ians ip. Te courts must 
be prepared to spend more time in formulating a precise and 
workable order to give full effect to the concept of limited 
guardianship, but the extra effort spent in ensuring the 
minimum deprivation of the rights of a disabled person is 
well worth it. 
In comparison, protection orders made under the Aged 
and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 seem rather general 
and lacking in specificity. Such an order merely records 
the name of the protected person, the name of the manager 
81. 
appointed, the nature of the protected estate and the powers 
251 
and duties in addition to the statutory ones. It would 
have been better if the order also specifies how the guardian ' s 
powers and duties are to be exercised, how the ward's 
needs are to be met and other relevant details as proposed 
in the discussion above. 
I . Costs of Hearing 
252 
The Victoria proposals support the provision of 
judicial hearings free of cost to the parties. The removal 
of all costs and economic barriers would ensure full access-
ibility to the benefits of guardianship for all. Therefore 
court charges, lawyers' fees, travelling costs and in 
exceptional circumstances, accommodation costs at the place 
of hearing incurred by the parties will be shouldered by the 
state. The rationale for this is analogous to underlying 
philosophy of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1975. 
The factors which lead to the application for a guardianship 
order are in fact an inherent risk to society as a whole. 
It is therefore justifiable to spread such a cost over the 
whole community and not let if fall on a small group of 
unfortunate citizens who have been burdened with it through 
accidental (family) circumstances. 
However praiseworthy such a social insurance scheme may 
sound, the truth of the matter is that no government in the 
present economic climate can finance such a scheme without a 
strain on the taxpayer's pockets. It is therefore more 
82. 
realistic to include hearing costs as charges against the 
ward's assets, if any, but if he is indigent, against the state 
itself in the form of legal aid.
253 
J. Review of Orders 
Periodic reviews are necessary for a fine-tuning of the 
powers and duties of a limited guardian to tailor-fit the 
changing needs of the ward as he or she moves towards normal-
isation and integration. The court should have power to 
reassess the order upon the request of any person at any time, 
or it must automatically review the case at regular intervals 
as stated in the order.
254 The Victoria model provides 
for automatic assessment within six months of the original 
order and proper reviews to be held at least once a year. 
In Alberta, orders appointing guardians must be reviewed by 
256 
the courts at least every two years. The Saskatchewan 
proposed Act provides for compulsory review anytime within 
five years of the date of the order.
257 
Although reviews may serve a number of other useful 
functions such as ensuring that the guardianship continues 
no longer than necessary; the disabled person has been receiv-
ing the prescribed services; the guardian has been diligent 
and acting in good faith; the guardian is adequately com-
258 
pensated for necessary out of pocket expenses; the 
frequency of automatic reviews may result in a congestion of 
the courts and an overworked system. Moreover, estate 
administrators willalready kept under the constant supervision 
83. 
of Public Advocates. The account statement and report 
of the significant changes in the ward's managerial skills 
which has to be filed by the conservator annually, is itsel f 
th f f . 
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ano er orm o review. Therefore, to prevent any 
administrative inconvenience and unnecessary state intervent-
ion, while at the same time, ensuring that guardians retain 
minimal powers which correspond with the changing capacity of 
the disabled person, it is suggested that the court should 
review an order upon the application of any interested person 
and at set intervals of not more than two years as the 
Dependent Adults Act 1976 has prescribed. 
To comply with the requirements of due process, adequate 
notice must be given to all interested parties of the review 
hearing, similar to that for a guardianship hearing.
260 During 
the hearing itself, the Court must always explore the possibil-
ity of why the guardianship should not be terminated instead 
of just being modified. Thirty nine American states have 
provisions explicitly authorising the disabled person to 
. . . . . d . 2 61 h . . . dd . . initiate a termination procee ing. T is is in a ition 
to the normal review procedures and is not a substitute for the 
periodic review process. It is an extra avenue for a 
disabled person to be free from guardianship when his capacity 
has significantly improved during the interval between review 
hearings. 262
 Instead of waiting for a review or rehearing 
of the case in the same court, a disabled person should be 
allowed to appeal to a higher court within three months 
263 
from the making of the order. 
8 4. 
K. Emergency Procedures 
There may be times when a person is in urgent need of an 
estate administrator, for example, he has suddenly become 
disabled because of an accident and is right in the middle of 
an important business deal, or he needs to arrange finance 
to pay for the proposed medical treatment. In such a case, 
the order must be temporary and restricted to the specific 
needs arising out of the emergency. A new hearing would have 
to be fixed to expand or restrict the guardian's powers as a 
speedy procedure is unlikely to access the precise ambit of the 
incapacity suffered. The Victoria proposals direct the 
guardianship tribunal to exercise guardianship powers itself 
in emergencies for a specified period and thereafter, must 
. t . d . . d 1 264 h · · appoin an in ivi ua. Due tote time constraint 
involved, notice provisions have to be shortened or dispensed 
with and the hearing must be held within forty eight hours 
of the filing of the application.
265 The possibility for 
abuse of an emergency procedure which bypasses the usual checks 
and balances of due process in a full proceeding by adopting the 
truncated version cannot be taken lightly. A guardian could 
make decisions which are irreversible and detrimental to the 
disabled person.
266 It is therefore important to stress that 
powers granted under an emergency order must be temporary and 
restricted to the needs of the emergency. As an extra safe-
guard, the order appointing an emergency guardian should 
require the guardian to consult the court to get approval for 
expenditure exceeding a certain amount. Perhaps the best solut-
85. 
ion for avoiding the problem of an emergency appointment is 
to ensure that for every guardian appointed, a standby guardian 
is also appointed.
261 This is only limited to those who 
' 
already have guardians, but not those who do not have guardians. 
This is because a standby guardian can only be appointed 
pursuant to the appointment of a guardian. 
86. 
IX MISCELLANEOUS FEATURES OF A GUARDIANSHIP SCHEME 
A. Testamentary, Standby and Emergency Guardians 
These guardians ensure continuity in the financial 
affairs of an adult ward by easing transitional difficulties 
arising out of the death, resignation or incapacitation of 
present conservators. 
There are existing legal provisions for testamentary 
guardianship of children whereby a parent (and not any other 
person) can appoint a person by deed or will to be a guar-
dian after that parent's death. Such an appointment has 
automatic effect only if the parent was himself or herself 
a guardian at the time of death and the appointee is of full 
age and capacity.
268 It is submitted that this method of 
appointing guardians be extended to the guardianship of 
disabled adults with some modifications. The appointment 
power should be available to a parent as well as a guardian 
and all appointments made should be subject to the Court's 
approval. 
An alternate or standby guardian may be appointed by 
the court at the same time as the immediate guardian is 
appointed. Upon the death of the existing guardian, 
there is an automatic transfer of guardianship authority 
to the standby guardian. The alternative guardian is 
preferred to the testamentary guardian because it ensures 
that the replacement guardian has been selected under the 
scrutiny of the guardianship hearing procedure. An appoint-
ment by will would by-pass the due process requirements of 
87. 
a hearing which are essential for safe-guarding the ward's 
interests. 
Where a standby guardian has not been appointed, there 
should be provisions for appointing emergency guardians for 
a temporary period before a proper guardianship hearing can 
be conducted and a more permanent guardian appointed. Due 
to the urgency of the matter, it is suggested that notice 
provisions be dispensed with or shortened and a hearing not 
269 
mandatory. 
B. Security to be Given to Court 
If individuals are to be given preference over the 
Public Trustee as estate administrators, then it is nec-
essary to require them to provide security upon appointment. 
This will indemnify the estate against exploitation or 
. b h d . . +- 270 incompetent management y t e estate a ministra_or. 
Almost every American jurisdiction requires conservators 
to file a surety bond to insure against waste or misapprop-
271 
riation by the conservator. Under the relevant New 
Zealand law, the Court is empowered to require security from 
h h bl
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any manager other tan t e Pu ic Trustee. The security 
given can be in the form of an insurance policy taken out by 
the administrator to cover the protected person in case of 
273 
fraud or mismanagement by the conservator. 
There may be some situations where security can be 
disposed with, for example, where the estate administrator 
cannot afford such an outlay of money. It would be against 
88. 
the spirit of a guardianship scheme to exclude persons 
who have all the attributes of a good estate administrator 
but who cannot provide security. 
C. Annual Accounts Statement and Report 
Under the present New Zealand legislation, a manager is 
required to file a statement in the Court or with the Public 
Trustee, showing the property comprised in the estate, the 
manner in which the property has been dealt with and such 
statement shall be supported by a statutory declaration or 
an affidavit.
274 It should not merely be an accounting 
statement but also a report on the significant changes in the 
managerial skills of the disabled person and the problems 
275 
encountered. This will provide valuable assistance to 
the Court when a case comes up for review. An accurate and 
comprehensive statement will enable the Court to make the 
necessary adjustments in the power relationship between the 
administrator and the disabled person to ensure that the 
latter is given maximum rights consistent with the minimal 
protection needed. Under the scrutiny of the Court, any 
suspicious transactions may be questioned for exploitation 
or incompetent administration, and the administrator required 
to reimburse the estate where such conduct is proved. If 
necessary, the security lodged with the Court can be enforced 
to recover the loss. 
D. Payment of Guardian 
All the American jurisdictions, apart from ten and the 
District of Columbia, allow personal guardians and conservat-
89. 
ors to collect a reasonable fee for services rendered, out 
f h f · 
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o t e inancial resources of the disabled person. In 
New Zealand, the estate manager is allowed to recover all 
expenses of administration and remuneration for services, out 
of the estate of the protected patient or person.
277 The 
. . 278 . 
Victoria proposals reJected the idea of paying a guardian 
or an administrator (other than a Public Trustee) for services 
performed in pursuance of a guardian order. The rationale 
being that payment would encourage the existence of a class 
of professional guardians. This would in turn, create 
potential conflicts of interests. A guardian who wants to 
protect his own financial remuneration may not be willing 
to train the disabled person to become independent and 
thereby making himself redundant. The advantages of having 
a voluntary scheme has been well documented in the context 
279 280 
of citizen advocacy. The Victoria Report goes so 
far as to disallow reimbursement for costs incurred which 
are incidental to the role of a guardian of the person or 
property on account of the possibility of conflicts of 
interests. However, this may result in the disabled pe
rson 
being deprived of the services of an appropriate administrator 
just because the latter is unable to afford certain basic 
expenses incidental to his role. It was therefore sug
gested 
that in cases of financial hardship, the administrator should 
be reimbursed for certain basic costs incurred by him or her, 
for example, transportation costs arising from performing his 
or her management functions. Although the Victoria Report 
90. 
wanted such reimbursement to come from government funds, 
this may prove to be an additional burden on the limited 
resources of the state. The estate administered should 
bear such costs with the assistance of government subsidies 
where appropriate. 
91. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The recent developments in the law and mental health 
research overseas expose the inadequacies and anomalies 
of the out-dated laws we have in New Zealand regarding the 
care of the person and property of the mentally disabled. 
The plenary protection offered by the Mental Health Act 1969 
and the Aged and Infirm Persons Protection Act 1912 has 
clearly failed to take into account the gradations of mental 
disability that people suffer from. There is a need to 
provide a broad spectrum of legal and community services 
from which the least restrictive alternative form of 
assistance can be chosen. The concept of limited guardian-
ship is an excellent example of the adaptability of the law 
to change according to the times. As well as being an 
attractive idea, it is also deceptively simple. In practice, 
it is not easy to tailor suit a guardianship order to the 
exact degree of incapacity of the individual. Judges must 
be prepared to spend more time and effort in framing such 
orders. The organisation of the guardianship scheme into one 
administrative structure will replace the uneasy coexistence 
of the Mental Health Act 1969 and the Aged and Infirm Persons 
Protection Act 1912. Rather than emphasising the need to 
offer protection to the disabled (the protection principle), 
the new scheme will be geared towards the normalisation 
and integration of the person (the rights principle). 
Because guardianship is a highly restrictive form of providing 
supervision and assistance to individuals, it can lead to a 
deprivation of legal rights. To avoid any unwarranted 
92. 
restriction of rights, all guardianship proceedings must 
be heard before a judicial body and must also contain 
adequate procedural safeguards. 
New Zealand has the benefit of learning from the 
mistakes of overseas legislation when framing her own 
guardianship laws. The fundamental problem however, 
is to avoid the displacement of goals. 
281 Elizabeth Boggs 
Do not confuse means with ends. 
In the words of 
Start with 
the ultimate goal of affirmative rights and 
benefits and work backward to find what 
"minimal" means will be required to assure 
the maintenance of the goal. Advocacy is a 
means, not an end. Guardianship is a means, 
not an end, and the process is also a means, 
not an end. Due process is a negative claim 
right; the affirmative right which we seek 
for each person substantially handicapped 
through impairment of his or her capacity for 
self-direction is human support which effect-
ively augments the person's own residual capac-
ities and reinforces his internal locus of 
control. 
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